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Abstract 
Achieving global food security has proven to be remarkably complicated and 
despite several decades of government and NGO interventions, still many people are 
facing (chronic) hunger. Recent years have witnessed a growing belief in the potential 
of collaboration with the private sector, as an alternative, more effective strategy. 
Consequently, different Public-Private Partnerships for development have been initiated 
with varying outcomes. This thesis examines three Public-Private Partnerships, all in 
cooperation with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that aim to improve food 
security in fragile states in Africa and compares it to Official Development Assistance, 
on the basis of their legitimacy.  
These PPPs are ‘Increase food security and improve livelihoods of sorghum and 
rice producers’ involving Heineken and EUCORD in several African countries; 
‘Cassava+ ‘Helping farmers produce cassava for profit’ by IFDC and DADTCO in 
Nigeria, Mozambique and Ghana; and, ‘Smarter Futures – Improving quality wheat and 
maize flour in Africa’ involving the Food Fortification Initiative, AKZO-Nobel and 
several NGOs, concentrating on the entire African continent. The former two are 
concerned with transforming subsistence crops into industrial and economically viable 
produce, therefore increasing small-holder farmer’s productivity and enlarging the 
market. The latter intends to increase the nutritional value of already commercialised 
food, through fortification. 
This thesis analyses these PPPs with regard to their activities, internal affairs and 
their results, based on reports, documents and expert interviews. The findings show the 
prospects and limitations of PPPs for improving local food security. They illustrate that 
PPPs do not escape the challenges faced by conventional, government-initiated food 
security initiatives, but that they could form an effective addition to the traditional ODA 
system. The conclusions address the effectiveness of involving private actors in 
achieving food security and the legitimacy of PPPs in comparison with government and 
NGO initiatives.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
With the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) reaching their 
target date this year, the balance-sheet is being drawn. The first of these Goals, reducing 
the proportion of undernourished people by half, has almost been reached. Since 1990 
the amount of people living in hunger has fallen with 200 million and the percentage of 
undernourished people decreased from 18.7 to 11.3 worldwide. 63 developing countries 
have reached MDG 1 and 25 of these have also reached the more stringent World Food 
Summit Goal to halve the amount of chronically underfed people (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 
2014:9). However, despite this positive note, still one in eight people worldwide are 
undernourished and 805 million people do not have sufficient food to lead a healthy life 
(United Nations, 2014). The majority of whom live in fragile and conflict-affected states 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. The region improved little in recent years, maintaining the 
highest prevalence (percentage of the population) of undernourishment (FAO, IFAD and 
WFP, 2014:9).  
Fragile states are extremely vulnerable to conflict, natural disasters and food price 
speculations because of their weak institutional capacity. They lack the ability to 
sufficiently address situations of instability. Therefore, these countries are faced with 
significantly lower levels of food security than their non-fragile developing 
counterparts. The percentage of undernourished people in fragile states is, on average, 
three times as high as in other developing countries and nearly 20% of the world’s 
undernourished people live in fragile states (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2010:15). 
Government effectiveness and income are both positively related to hunger and 
undernourishment (Breisinger et al, 2014:2-3; Alinovi et al, 2007:5). Moreover, the 
number of years a country suffers from fragility is negatively correlated with the level 
of food security, indicating that the longer a country is fragile, the more food insecure it 
will become (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2010:16). However, fragility does not only affect 
food security, it also works conversely, therefore “tackling food insecurity and related 
2 
 
problems of agricultural underproduction and resource scarcity can do much to stabilize 
a fragile situation” (Alinovi et al, 2007:5).  
Evidently, food security is extremely difficult to achieve, especially in fragile 
states. Besides the lack of institutional capacity this is also partly due to the overarching 
scope of the concept of food security (Breisinger et al, 2014, Ecker and Breisinger, 2012, 
Yu et al, 2010). The 1996 World Food Summit defined food security as a situation in 
which “all people, at all times have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, 
safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active 
and healthy life” (World Food Summit, 1996). Alarmed by the still increasing number 
of malnourished people in the world, this definition got extended during the 2009 World 
Food Summit. Here, the four pillars of food security got defined: availability of food, 
physical and economic access to food, utilisation and stability of food over time (World 
Food Summit, 2009). The importance of this modification is that it called for a 
comprehensive focus on both the household and national level of food security. This 
research will focus on food availability, accessibility and stability. 
By increasing the provision of food assistance to fragile and conflict affected 
states in Africa, the international community has shown significant efforts to improve 
food security in this region. For several decades governments and NGO’s have already 
actively been providing aid to the continent. Around 30% of total Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) goes to fragile states (Ishihara, 2012:2). Unfortunately, much of this 
aid is not used effectively, which results in only 20% of fragile states being well 
underway to meet the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 (OECD, 2014:17). 
Consequently, recent years have witnessed an important change in the system 
around the provision of Official Development Assistance. In order to improve the 
effectiveness of development aid cooperation between public and private actors is 
sought more often. An increasing number of multinational food manufacturers such as 
Unilever and Nestlé are developing policies to actively partake in improving food 
security in developing countries (Global Alliance, 2013:9), but also small and medium 
firms are becoming increasingly involved in these regions. Due to their extensive 
technological knowledge, financial resources and management skills, businesses are 
very attractive partners for public actors and NGO’s. Also within the UN apparatus the 
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value of private actors has been acknowledged and in 2012 UN Secretary General Ban 
Ki-moon launched the UN Zero Hunger Challenge, which calls upon civil society, 
governments and businesses to join hands in order to eradicate worldwide hunger and 
malnutrition (United Nations Zero, 2014). Cooperation between these various actors 
could result in Public Private Partnerships.  
The majority of the research on the advantages of Public-Private Partnerships has 
been empirical and the widely-held notion that there exists no better alternative is 
therefore not based on the real life experiences. This thesis will therefore aim to aid in 
filling this gap by evaluating the legitimacy of Public Private Partnerships which aim to 
improve food security in fragile states in Africa. The outcome will be compared to the 
legitimacy of the current food assistance system that is provided by means of Official 
Development Aid.  
1.2 Research questions 
The above review made clear that there is room for research on the possibilities 
and potential of public-private partnerships for enhancing food security in fragile states. 
Consequently, this master thesis will answer the following question:  
 
Are Public-Private Partnerships legitimate tools of global governance to 
improve food assistance in fragile states compared to Official Development Assistance 
(ODA)?  
 
In order to provide a comprehensive answer to the research question several sub-
questions will be addressed:  
- How legitimate is Official Development Assistance of food to fragile states?  
- How legitimate are public-private partnerships for food assistance in fragile 
states?  
- Can public-private partnerships be legitimate policy instruments to improve food 
assistance in fragile states compared to ODA?  
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Together, these three questions provide a complete picture of the legitimacy of Public-
Private Partnerships that aim to improve food security in fragile states. The general 
claim about PPPs is that they can provide more efficient and legitimate long-term 
development assistance than the traditional ODA system (Martens, 2007:32-34). In 
order to analyse whether this claims holds true it is necessary to examine the legitimacy 
of both methods.  
1.3 Literature review 
 
Food assistance and Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
Food assistance can generally be divided into three forms, programme food 
assistance, relief or emergency food assistance and project food assistance (Mousseau, 
2005:3-4). Programme food assistance used to be the predominant form of aid. It 
represents an in-kind form of economic assistance. Contrary to what the term might 
suggest it is not given freely. Food is produced in the donor country and sold for lower 
than market prices in the recipient country. Towards the end of the 20th  century this 
form of aid became less popular and got replaced by a focus on emergency food 
assistance, which is provided for free by the World Food Programme, among others, to 
countries facing significant threats to their food security.  
Project food assistance is similar to emergency food assistance in the sense that 
it is also provided in form of donations. However, contrary to emergency food 
assistance, project food assistance has a more sustainable focus, promoting agricultural 
and economic development in order to improve long-term food security (Mousseau, 
2005:3-4). Programme food assistance aims at fostering market development and 
overall economic growth, while emergency food assistance is crucial in averting 
temporary situations of food insecurity from turning into a chronic situation (Mousseau, 
2005:13). This latter form of aid represented 44% of the total humanitarian emergency 
assistance spending in 2009 (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2010:32). The majority of this 
assistance, approximately 60%, is delivered through multilateral channels. Only 11% is 
dispersed via bilateral agreements. The remaining 29% is provided for by NGOs (World 
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Food Programme, 2013:15). The focus of this research will be on project aid, because 
of its long-term approach, making food security more sustainable, instead of providing 
emergency relief. Because of these characteristics it is comparable to public-private 
partnerships, which, by their nature, are long-term projects.  
 During the 1990s the term food aid gradually became substituted by food 
assistance, moving towards a policy focussing on “improving access to food, which 
targets most vulnerable households who face food access deficits; investing livelihoods 
that targets recovery source of livelihoods and supporting safety nets that targets 
prevention of loss of livelihoods” (Diriye et al, 2014:397). Parallel with this policy shift, 
the Official Development Assistance (ODA) to fragile states increased significantly. 
Between 2000 and 2012 per capita ODA to fragile states grew with 46% compared to 
27% in non-fragile countries, resulting in 30% of total ODA being sent to these states 
in 2010 (OECD, 2013b:43-46). Also the proportion of aid spend on food grew 
accordingly from one million metric tons on average a year in the 1970s to more than 
3.3 million metric tons in the 1990s (Abdulai et al. 2004:17).  
Unfortunately, since 2009, we can detect an increasing downward trend in the 
volume of aid. In 2010, DAC countries disbursed 5% less aid than planned. This 
decreased even further in 2011 to an 8% decline in aid (OECD, 2012b:5-6). Although, 
aid to fragile states decreased less significantly, also these countries saw their foreign 
assistance decline. In 2011 ODA to fragile states decreased by 2.4% compared to the 
previous year, following a 1% decline between 2009 and 2010 (OECD, 2014:24). 
Moreover, more than half of ODA to fragile states in 2011 went to just seven recipient 
countries. Afghanistan and DRC are heading the list. Consequently, the remaining 
fragile states each received, on average, less than half a percentage of the total ODA 
(OECD, 2014:27). This downward trend in ODA can be critical to fragile states, since 
many of them are highly dependent on this source of income. As a matter of fact, for the 
majority of fragile states ODA forms the largest source of income. In 2011 it varied 
between roughly 10% of GDP in Guinea-Bissau up to 55% in Tuvalu (OECD, 2014:30).  
According to Lentz and Barrett (2005:10) “an individual, household or 
community exhibits dependency when it cannot meet its immediate basic needs without 
external assistance”. Aiding these individuals or households to secure their basic needs 
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is not necessarily undesirable. When welfare enhancing, providing external assistance 
can certainly be desirable. This is what Lentz and Barrett (2005:10) termed ‘positive 
dependency’. However, ‘negative dependency’ arises when recipients remain unable to 
meet their basic needs in the future without external assistance. This is due to the change 
in behaviour associated with food assistance. Expectations of assistance might for 
example decrease one’s incentives to provide for one’s own needs. But also 
policymakers might lack the incentives to invest in agriculture and rural infrastructure 
(Abdulai et al, 2004:29-30; Barrett, 2006:7). Moreover, in-kind food assistance could 
further lead to a disruption of the local and domestic food prices. The increase on the 
supply-side could put a lid on the price fluctuations. Ultimately, this might disrupt the 
market (Abdulai et al, 2004:22-23; Timmer, 2005:2).   
Although much academic literature has focussed on the negative dependency 
effect of food assistance there are several other negative side-effects critics point out as 
well, such as a lack of proper timing and targeting of the aid provided. The inertia of the 
food assistance system often results in late and poorly targeted deliveries. This is 
because the majority of food assistance is provided for by international organisations 
such as WFP that need to send their employees from abroad. The food assistance given 
to Malawi in 2002 after a failed harvest, for example, had taken off too late and as a 
consequence was still provided a year later during the following harvest (Mousseau, 
2005:15). Logistic constraints were the reason for the delay. Not only do logistics make 
the aid very time-demanding and inflexible, the cost-effectiveness also decreases. For 
example, during the 2004 tsunami in South-East Asia almost half of the WFP relief 
budget was spent on logistic expenses (Mousseau, 2005:22).  
 Emergency food assistance can be crucial in providing access to food and 
nutrition in dire situations, while programme food assistance could foster market 
development and overall economic growth (Barrett, 2006:9). However, this only holds 
when aid is delivered on a short-term basis and when it is well targeted. “When aid 
becomes persistent and a long-term assistance intervention, there is no doubt that it can 
create dependence, affect agricultural production and influence market prices, which 
negatively impact food production resulting in severe food insecurity” (Diriye et all, 
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2014:398). Overall, these negative effects of food assistance have made critics doubt its 
effectiveness.  
 
Effectiveness of food assistance in fragile states 
In recent years aid effectiveness has become the fuzz word in aid circles. In 1996 
the OECD/DAC published its report ‘Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of 
Development Cooperation’ in which it argued that “development assistance will only 
work where there is a shared commitment of all the partners” (OECD/DAC, 1996:1). 
Subsequently, it argued that there is a need for increased coherence and coordination 
among the donor’s policies and activities, as well as more support for “locally owned 
development strategies” (Development Assistance Committee, 1996:2). This report 
primarily used a donor-oriented focus. The 1998 World Bank report ‘Assessing Aid: 
What Works, What Doesn’t and Why’, on the contrary, had a more proficient recipient-
oriented approach to improving aid effectiveness. The report argues that development 
aid is only effective in countries with a sound policy environment and strong trade and 
fiscal policies. In countries lacking these policies and institutions aid is wasted. 
Therefore, in order for aid to be effective it should be combined with the ‘right’ policies 
(World Bank: 1998:2-3).  
As a result of these reports, as well as the broader focus on aid effectiveness, the  
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness got created in 2005. It got signed and endorsed 
by more than a 100 donors and recipient countries. In 2008 this declaration got 
reaffirmed by the Accra Agenda for Action committing its signatories to adhere to 
several principles in order to improve aid effectiveness. These principles focussed on 
country ownership, alignment of donor support with national development strategies, 
harmonization of donor arrangements and procedures, results-oriented frameworks and 
mutual accountability for the progress and implementation of the aid which ought to be 
transparent and predictable (OECD, 2008:3-8). Despite these good intentions, progress 
has been slow. Only 1 out of the 13 targets set in the Paris Declaration had been met by 
their due date in 2010 (United Nations System, 2013:20).  
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Addressing food insecurity and aid effectiveness in fragile states asks for a 
different approach from the international community than do similar situations in non-
fragile countries. The New Deal for engagement in fragile states outlines the 
shortcomings of development aid to fragile states. First, coordination of the supply of 
aid is often fragmented, resulting in parallel structures of different aid suppliers. Second, 
assistance is often short term, which could hamper long-term growth. Finally, there is a 
lack of comprehensive focus on providing aid and technical assistance as well as long-
term state-building and civil service reforms (International Dialogue, 2011:58-63).  
Fortunately, the understanding for a more comprehensive approach to aiding 
fragile states is growing. The FAO outlined this in its annual rapport ‘The State of Food 
Insecurity in the World’ by arguing that reducing hunger requires an integrated approach 
engaging both the public and private sector, as well as civil society (FAO, IFAD and 
WFP, 2014:39). This call is in line with a general tendency for a broader approach to 
development aid in order to improve its effectiveness. In 2011 the Busan Partnership 
Agreement got signed. Recognising the changing character of international development 
assistance, the agreement calls upon a wide range of actors to cooperate in order to 
effectively provide development aid, ranging from governments and non-governmental 
organisations to private firms. It laid the foundation for the Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation (OECD, 2012:1-2).  
 
Public-Private Partnerships 
 Since the 1990s, but especially since the turn of the century, public-private 
partnerships have gained attention, due to the increasingly globalized world. This hybrid 
form of governance became part of the UN family in 1992 when the Conference on the 
Environment and Development (Rio Conference) adopted ‘Agenda 21’, which stated 
that “governments, business and industry, including transnational corporations, should 
strengthen partnerships to implement the principles and criteria for sustainable 
development” (United Nations, 1992:290). Kofi Annan, supported this development 
when he stated during his inauguration in 1998 that one of his priorities was to “establish 
a new partnership for development between the United Nations and the private sector” 
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(Annan, 1998:135). Matching his words with deeds he announced the establishment of 
the UN Global Compact in 1999, one of the largest partnerships engaging both the public 
and private sector in improving and implementing, among others, human rights and 
environmental policies.  
   The 2002 Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development set the stage by 
inviting the private sectors and NGO’s to take part in the preparatory phase of the 
conference. For the first time, private actors were able to take part in negotiations 
alongside public and civil society actors (Martens, 2007:16). This tendency got 
continued at the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), which 
took place in September of the same year. This summit is remarkable as it concludes 
more than 200 ‘Type-2 Outcomes’, the so-called partnerships between public, private 
and other non-state actors (Buckup, 2012:9). As Simon Zadek (2004:21) noted: “the 
Johannesburg Summit was more than anything about partnerships. Just as Rio was much 
about legitimising the role of NGOs in global governance as it was about the 
environment, Johannesburg was about the legitimacy of the role of business in 
development, working with public bodies and civil society organisations”.  
 In accordance with the growing number of PPPs, the academic literature shifted 
from  predominantly investigating relations among nation states, towards research on 
transnational partnerships. Especially finding a definition of this new type of governance 
was of interest to many researchers. Due to the variety of public-private relationships it 
is widely acknowledged that there is no clear definition on what exactly a PPP 
encompasses. As Weihe argues, the concept of public-private partnership is ambiguous, 
“it allows for great variance across parameters such as time, closeness of cooperation, 
types of products/services, costs, complexity, level of institutionalisation, as well as 
number of actors involved” (Weihe, 2006:1). The subsequent table outlines several of 
these definitions.   
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Table 1.1: Definitions of Public-Private Partnerships 
(adapted from Buckup, 2012:26) 
 
 
 Despite this lack of conformity there are some basic aspects of PPPs on which  
common ground can be found.  
- Partnerships are created to provide a public good (Buckup, 2012; Schäferhoff et 
al, 2009; Homkes, 2011; Risse and Börzel, 2005). A public good is defined as a 
good “with nonexclusive benefits and non-rival consumption” (Schäferhoff et al, 
2009:454).   
- Partnerships employ voluntary and hierarchical modes of governance (Risse and 
Börzel, 2005; Homkes, 2011). This is what sets PPPs apart from other modes of 
governance as it does not set rules or laws and the actors are involved in the 
partnerships on a voluntary basis (Andonova, 2006:2).  
11 
 
- Partnerships are multi-stakeholder institutions (Buckup, 2012; Homkes, 2011). 
Although, all definitions agree on this characteristics, one strand of the literature 
argues that at least one stakeholder is required to be a public actor and one a 
private organisation. The partnerships in this group are often termed ‘public- 
private partnerships’ (Andonova, 2006; Risse and Börzel, 2005, Schäferhoff et 
al, 2009). The other strand does not make such a requirement. According to its 
supporters, a partnership can involve any stakeholder in civil society, no matter 
whether private or public. These partnerships are known as ‘multi-stakeholder 
partnerships’ (Zadek, 2005).  
- Partnerships are always either institutions or organisations. Some argue that 
partnerships are official organisations with its stakeholders as partly independent 
actors (Pattberg and Dingwerth, 2006). Others view PPPs as institutions in which 
the focus lies on the interaction between the stakeholders (Andonova, 2006; 
Schäferhoff et al, 2009).  
- Finally, partnerships are global relationships. Public-private partnerships are 
global in the sense that they constitute partners from distinct countries and 
backgrounds. However, this does not imply that the stakeholders themselves need 
to be represented globally (Buckup, 2012; Andonova, 2006; Schäferhoff, 2009).   
 
Based on the above literature review a public-private partnership in this research will be 
defined as ‘a voluntary, institutional and transnational relationship between several 
actors of which at least one is public and one private who jointly commit to invest 
resources in the provision of a global public good’.  
 
Debating partnerships 
 Despite the growing promotion of PPPs as unique structures to address today´s 
global challenges, they are far from a proven mode of governance. The general believe 
about public-private partnerships is that they will improve the legitimacy and problem-
solving capacity of international governance structures, because they combine the 
various strengths of their stakeholders (Rosenau, 1999:10-11; Martens, 2007:32; Börzel 
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and Risse, 2002:14-15). The neo-liberal argument in support of PPPs argues that the 
private sector provides technical knowledge, efficiency and entrepreneurial expertise 
that the public sector and civil society are lacking. Another strand of proponents argue 
that the involvement of non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations to the 
partnerships is crucial as well, since these actors will increase the democratic nature and 
accountability of the partnership (Börzel and Risse, 2002:14). Combining the strengths 
of these varying actors will improve the effectiveness, legitimacy, and the accountability 
of the international governance institutions (Börzel and Risse, 2002:1; Bäckstrand, 
2006:291).  
On the basis of these stands, the advantages of PPPs are summarized using three 
deficits in the traditional intergovernmental system providing development aid that PPPs 
are expected to fill (Bierman et al 2007; Martens, 2007; Bäckstrand, 2006). This thesis 
will examine whether this is the case. The following deficits will be assessed:   
-  Regulatory or governance deficit. Partnerships are expected to provide avenues 
for global issues to which the solution is now hampered due to the existing 
intergovernmental system. The traditional governance system is hindered by 
differing governmental interests and lacking capacity and competence. 
Partnerships are thought to step in where governments fail.  
- Participation deficit. Participation in governance is one of the main aspects of 
democracy. Unfortunately, in the intergovernmental system many non-state 
actors are excluded from governance. Partnerships are supposed to bridge this 
gap, by including these actors in the negotiation and decision-making process. 
Moreover, by their consensus based approach they reduce the costs of 
compliance to international agreements.  
- Implementation deficit. Governments often fail to implement policies made at 
the international level because of a lack of knowledge, financial means, or 
sometimes political will. This is the case with environmental policies, such as the 
Copenhagen agreement. The idea is to include non-state actors as they can 
mobilise funds and are thought to better strive for implementation of particular 
policies (Bierman et al 2007:8; Martens, 2007:33; Bäckstrand, 2006:303).  
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Despite this positive note, there are several significant remarks to be made. 
Critics point out that partnerships do not necessarily fill these deficits (Bierman et al, 
2007; Martens 2007, Rosenau Vaillancourt, 1999). How can partnerships be 
accountable if the actors themselves are unaccountable? Moreover, partnerships often 
claim to aid in filling the participation deficit, but who is responsible for selecting the 
partners? Often, various stakeholders themselves decide to form a partnership, which 
generally makes them exclusive, decreasing the representativeness and thus the 
legitimacy (Martens, 2007:39). Also the effectiveness of PPPs is criticised on lacking 
the acclaimed problem-solving capacity. The provision of public goods get shifted from 
the public sector to non-state actors, in which the former depends on the latter for 
financial resources and technical expertise. This shift of authority could easily result in 
problem-shifting instead of problem-solving. Revoking the delegation is not an option, 
since the functions were delegated to non-state actors, because the public authority was 
unable of properly provide them in the first place (Börzel and Risse, 2002:15). Besides, 
bringing those actors to the table who are burdened by implementing the policies might 
result in lowest common denominator solutions. Compromises might lead to the 
watering down of regulations. Also the implementation gap would therefore not 
necessarily be filled.  
 
Input and output legitimacy 
 As explained in the previous section proponents of PPPs expect this form of 
governance to improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of aid. In a democratic system 
a regime is legitimate, because citizens hold their rulers accountable for their actions by 
participating in the decision-making process through representation and voting. Beyond 
the nation-state, this mechanism of accountability is mostly absent. Consequently, 
global governance systems could face legitimacy problems (Risse, 2004:6-7). Instead of 
focussing on the independent actors, legitimacy refers to the general democratic quality 
of the political and social order; its institutions, rules and norms (Bäckstrand 2006; 
Risse, 2004; Kylsäter, 2011; Schäferhoff et al 2009; Schouten, 2013). This research will 
use a normative approach to legitimacy in which the concept concerns both input and 
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output legitimacy. Input legitimacy refers to the “participatory quality of the decision-
making process” (Bäckstrand, 2006:294). This includes the transparency, representation 
and accountability of the partnership. Output legitimacy, on the other hand, concerns 
the problem-solving capacities and goal-rationality of the partnerships. It refers to its 
effectiveness. Based on this normative approach there are six attributes of legitimacy 
that will be studied.  
 
Table 1.2: Operationalisation of the concept of legitimacy 
(adapted from Kylsäter, 2011:55) 
Value Operationalisation 
1. Representativeness What groups and kind of actors are 
represented in the PPP? Do we find 
governments, IOs, NGOs, business etc. as 
members of the PPP? 
2. Inclusion To what extent can different actors 
participate in the decision-making 
process of the PPP? Are all the members 
included in the same way, or do we find 
imbalances? 
3. Transparency Does the PPP seem to have an open 
decision-making process and 
organisational structure? Is it easy for 
outsiders to find information about what 
the PPP is working with? 
4. Deliberation What room does the PPP have for debates 
in its activities? Can it be seen to increase 
the deliberation within its policy area?  
5. Goal rationality  Are the PPP’s activities coherent with its 
goals and are these rational to achieve? Or 
is the PPP working with several different 
things that only vaguely lead towards its 
goals? 
6. Effectiveness What regulations and programmes has the 
PPP created to implement its policy? Do 
the stakeholders and subjects to this 
policy comply with it? Does this policy 
and the actions taken by the PPP actually 
lead to solving the problem at hand?  
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The first four values, representativeness, inclusion, transparency and deliberation, 
account for input legitimacy, as these are concerned with the policy-making process. 
The latter two, effectiveness and goal orientation will measure output legitimacy, since 
they are related to the policy outcome.  
 Some authors argue that input and output legitimacy are mutually exclusive. In 
this respect, high output legitimacy could compensate for low input legitimacy. Vice 
versa, a lack of effectiveness asks for increased input legitimacy in terms of transparent 
and accountable decision-making processes (Bäckstrand, 2006:294). Börzel and Risse 
(2002:18), on the other hand, argue that a trade-off between input and output legitimacy 
might arise. More inclusive PPPs might have to give in on effectiveness, since there are 
many stakeholders that want to influence the policy. However, the more exclusive a 
partnership becomes the less accountable and transparent, decreasing in legitimacy. This 
thesis will examine whether this argument holds true or whether partnerships can be 
both inclusive and effective.  
 
1.4 Theoretical perspective 
International organisations and multilateral companies, global issues such as 
climate change and the economic crisis, and trans-border structures like financial flows 
are all a result of globalization. Because of this process non-state actors such as NGO’s 
and private entities have increasingly gained power affecting the traditional Westphalian 
system which was centred around the nation state. In the words of Jan Aart Scholte 
(2005:186) “regulatory operations of territorial bureaucratic national governments, also 
called ‘statism’, are no longer viable and are being replaced by polycentrism”. 
Consequently, states are faced with a loss of sovereignty. Laws and regulations are not 
applicable in the same way on an international level as they are in the national sphere. 
Supranational organisations, such as the EU, have gained power to develop their own 
regulatory system to which member states need to abide. However, globalization does 
not necessarily reduce the role of nation states, it redefines it based on changing 
pressures and actors on the national and international level (Baer, 2011:20). 
Consequently, governance can no longer be viewed as solely exercised by governments. 
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As Rosenau (1995:13) mentioned “governance is conceived to include systems of rule 
at all levels of human activity – from the family to the international organisations – in 
which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational 
repercussions”.  
 This very broad definition has been widely criticised and debated. In the words 
of Finkelstein (1995:368) “Global Governance appears to be virtually anything” 
pointing towards the lack of consensus on its meaning. These varying ideas derive 
mostly from disagreement on the meaning of governance. “Many academics and 
international practitioners employ governance to connote a complex set of structures 
and processes, both public and private, while more popular writers tend to use it 
synonymously with government” (Weiss, 2000:795). Stoker then argues that “there is, 
however, a baseline agreement that governance refers to the development of governing 
styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become 
blurred. The essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not 
rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government” (Stoker, 1998:17). In this 
sense, one could speak of governance as a narrower definition of government focussing 
on cooperation between the state and non-state actors.  
 Pattberg and Dingwerth (2006:189) make a distinction between an analytical – 
“the actual, perceived, or constructed reality of contemporary world politics” – and a 
normative usage of the term Global Governance, indicating the way international 
political institutions should address pressing global issues. This thesis will focus on the 
analytical use of the term. According to this point of departure, Global Governance can 
be traced to the growing dissatisfaction of international relations’ students with the 
existing theories. The dominant theories of realism and neo-liberal could no longer 
capture the changing international landscape which centred around the nation-state 
(Baer, 2011:13). According to the analytical perspective on Global Governance there 
are four aspects in which this new discipline differs from the more traditional ones.  
First, Global Governance does not revolve around “politics among nations”, but 
instead views non-governmental organisations and private actors, among others, as 
equally important (Pattberg and Dingwerth, 2006:191). There is no hierarchy in the 
international system. Second, while other theories of international relations regard 
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international interaction as distinct from interaction at other levels, Global Governance, 
in contrast, views world politics as a multilevel system in which local, national and 
global interaction are linked. Third, international relations theories focus on power, 
security and interstate bargaining. Global Governance in contrast, argues that many 
forms of governance exist alongside one another without hierarchy. There exists no 
single organising principle. Fourth, while international relations tend to focus on 
authority, legitimacy and a state’s ability to pursue its self-interest, global governance 
includes the emergence of new spheres of authority in the international landscape apart 
from nation states (Pattberg and Dingwerth, 2006:191-193). An example of such new 
authority would be private firms that regulate whole market segments. Public-Private 
Partnerships perfectly fit this theory, as they are transnational institutions combining 
actors from different backgrounds which work together at various levels lacking a clear 
hierarchy.  
 
1.5 Methodology 
 This section outlines the methodological reasoning behind the approach used in 
this study. First, the design of the research will be explained, followed by the sampling 
strategy. The way the data are collected and analysed will then be discussed, concluding 
with the methodological challenges.  
 
Research design 
 In order to properly answer the research question a qualitative study will be 
conducted. The research question asks for a deeper understanding of the perception of 
Public-Private Partnerships as being legitimate. Relatively little academic research has 
been done on the legitimacy of Public-Private Partnerships. Moreover, legitimacy is not 
a static concept, but can rather be classified as a relative notion about which “there are 
no universally shared criteria” (Koppell, 2008:192). Consequently, this research is of an 
exploratory and interpretative nature using a qualitative approach in order to best tackle 
and incorporate these perceptions and opinions. A quantitative method would not be 
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suitable here as it looks for relations between concepts, but leaves out the explanations 
or mechanisms that are the cause of these relations (Boeije, 2014:32).  
 A document study will then be applied and combined with a case study analysis. 
According to Altheide (1996:2) a document study is “an integrated and conceptually 
informed method procedure and technique for locating, identifying, retrieving and 
analysing documents for their relevance, significance and meaning”. A document 
analysis is helpful for gaining an understanding of, and demarcating the theory that will 
be used in the research. It allows the researcher to give direction to the study (Boeije, 
2014:61) Relevant articles will be selected, while omitting others. This approach is used 
when writing the theoretical background. However, in order to compare the legitimacy 
of Public-Private Partnerships to the current system of food assistance, an analysis of 
the latter ought to be made. This will also be done using document analysis by 
examining documents from the FAO, WFP, IFPRI and the OECD. These would 
primarily concern reports involving statistical data and theories about the state of affairs 
of food assistance to Africa.  
 Three case studies have further been selected to obtain a detailed picture of the 
legitimacy of Public-Private Partnerships that aim to improve food security. The use of 
case studies here fits the exploratory nature of the research, since a case study provides 
in-depth information about a particular case (within-case study) in which the hypotheses 
generated by the literature can be tested. The internal validity of the research will 
therefore be significant. However, due to this in-depth approach possible new 
hypotheses can be generated as well (Gerring, 2007:39-43). Since not one single case, 
but three distinct cases are being studied in this research it is also possible to compare 
the characteristics of each of them, resulting in cross-case variation and allowing for 
hypothesis testing.  
  
Sampling strategy 
The cases have been selected using document analysis, which allowed for 
purposive sampling of the three Public-Private Partnerships. Based on the literature and 
theory on PPPs and legitimacy three cases have been chosen in order to allow for 
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maximum variation. The cases where selected based on their partners, geographical 
area, number of years active, their budget and their ranking on the Fragile States Index. 
A focus on PPPs in Africa has been chosen because African countries score highest on 
average in every single of the fragility indexes evaluated. Moreover, as indicated in the 
2014 report ‘Building Resilience for Food and Nutrition Security’ published by IFPRI 
23 out of the 27 countries most vulnerable to food insecurity are located in Africa 
(Barrett and Headey, 2014:18). A clear business-driven case was selected, one which is 
led by NGO’s primarily aimed at lobbying, and one which has encountered some start-
up difficulties. Proponents of quantitative analysis argue that this sampling method 
results in low external validity, because the cases are not selected at random and thus 
lack representativeness (Gerring, 2007:43). However, by electing those cases that allow 
for variation in characteristics that would also appear in the population under 
investigation, it is possible to allow for inductive generalisation (Boeije, 2014:66).  
 In selecting the case studies, also their ranking on the Fragile States Index has 
been taken into account. This index categorises countries in 11 categories based on their 
level of fragility ranging from ‘very high alert’, including South Sudan and Somalia 
among others, to ‘very sustainable’, which is only made up of Finland (Haken et al, 
2014:4-5). The projects selected for this research are initiated in countries characterized 
by an ‘alert’ or ‘very high warning’ level of fragility. The Fund for Peace’ Fragile States 
Index was selected for this research using the UNDP’s Users’ Guide on Measuring 
Fragility (2009). This guide examines and compares the indices based on conceptual 
analysis. After comparing 11 fragility indices the Fragile States Index appeared most 
suitable for this research, based on its coverage, use of indicators to cover state fragility, 
methodology and the readability of the indices.  
 In order to obtain a picture of each of the partnerships that is as broad and detailed 
as possible, partners from all three sectors where interviewed; i.e. a representative of the 
public sector entity, one from the private sector partner and one from the civil society 
organisation(s) involved, resulting in a total of 9 interviews. As a result of their 
background each of these partners provided a different point of view on the partnership, 
together making up a picture resembling reality. The interviewees where selected using 
the snowball method (Boeije, 2014:69). Using previous contacts at the Ministry of 
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Foreign Affairs the contact information from the other partners got obtained as well. 
The partners where first approached via an e-mail containing a formal letter with 
information about the research and the content of the interview, as well as the way the 
information would be dealt with. To none it was a problem to record the interview, nor 
to use their (organisation’s) names in the research paper.  
 
Data collection 
A minority of the data will be obtained assessing progress reports and related 
documents from the partners. The majority of the information is obtained through face-
to-face interviews with representatives of the partners who are highly involved in the 
projects. This will be done in order to get an all-encompassing vision of the projects, 
because the partners might have different incentives and stakes. Experts interviews are 
conducted with persons who have proficient knowledge about the topic at hand and have 
in depth insight in the ins and outs of the organisation or project (Baer, 2011:102). “One 
of the most important functions of an elite interview is to try to assist the political 
scientist in understanding the theoretical position/s of the interviewee; his/her 
perceptions, belief and ideologies. Such information can rarely be gleaned from 
examining books, documents or records. By their very nature, elite interviews provide a 
subjective account for an event or issue” (Richards, 1996:199-200). This research 
method is therefore especially useful concerning issues about which is relatively little 
known, which is the case in this research on PPPs, since there is no academic knowledge 
yet about the legitimacy of the projects under examination.  
In general interviews allow the interviewee to elaborate on their answer. Semi-
structured interviews make it possible to deviate from the prepared questions and adapt 
to the specific project as well as the conversation. This particular method of interviewing 
has been chosen, because it makes it possible to compare the interview outcomes, as 
well as to categorise the answers (Baer, 2011:103). Consequently, it will be possible to 
look for common as well as divergent characteristics among the PPPs, which is 
necessary in order to draw conclusions on their legitimacy.  
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Data analysis 
Each of the cases will be evaluated based on its input and output legitimacy, as 
has been done as well to analyse the current system of food aid. Consequently, it will be 
possible to compare the three partnerships under study to the traditional system of food 
assistance. In both the traditional system as well as the case studies, legitimacy will be 
operationalised based on the six attributes outlined in Table 1.2. Each attribute indicates 
a particular aspect of legitimacy. The advantages of using this analytical framework of 
legitimacy and effectiveness is that it operationalizes the concepts, structuring the 
research. Moreover, it also provides a broad and all-encompassing approach to the 
values of “good governance”, which can be applied in various contexts. It allows for 
diversion of the state-centric approach that is often used for understanding the concept 
of legitimacy and regime effectiveness. A necessary and sufficient approach will be used 
to assess the PPPs’ level of legitimacy. This means that all attributes of the concept need 
to be present in order to constitute it (Gerring 2007:126-128). A high level of 
transparency, for example could therefore not compensate for a low level of inclusion.  
 In order to properly assess these attributes a value between 1 and 5 will be 
assigned to each of them based on the extent to which the attribute is present. An ordinal 
measurement scale will be used, which includes the following categories.  
1. = absence  
2. = low presence  
3. = medium presence  
4. = high presence  
5. = very high presence 
For example, in case a PPP scores 2 on representativeness, the extent to which all the 
parties affected by the PPP are represented in the partnerships is fairly low. This mode 
of measurement allows for cross-case comparison of the attributes.  
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Table 1.3: Operationalisation of the legitimacy indicators 
 Score = 1 Score = 2 Score = 3 Score = 4 Score = 5 
Representativeness 
 
Only one private and 
one public actor are 
represented in the 
PPP. 
 
Only one private, one 
pubic and one civil 
society actor are 
represented in the 
PPP. 
At least one private, 
one public and one 
civil society actor are 
represented in the 
PPP, however, the 
majority comes from 
the developed region. 
At least two private, 
two public and two 
civil society actors are 
represented in the 
PPP, however they are 
not equally divided 
between the 
developed and 
developing region.   
 
Actors from the public 
and private arena and 
civil society from both 
the developed and 
developing region are 
equally represented in 
the PPP. 
Inclusion 
 
Only one private and 
one public actor are 
included in the 
decision-making 
process. 
 
Only one private, one 
pubic and one civil 
society actor are 
included in the 
decision-making 
process.  
At least one private, 
one public and one 
civil society actor are 
included in the 
decision-making 
process, however, the 
majority comes from 
the developed region. 
At least two private, 
two public and two 
civil society actors are 
included in the 
decision-making 
process, however they 
are not equally 
divided between the 
developed and 
developing region.   
 
Actors from the public 
and private arena and 
civil society from both 
the developed and 
developing region are  
included in the 
decision-making 
process. 
Transparency 
 
The internal state of 
affairs, the decision-
making and evaluation 
process of the PPP are 
not open and 
A minority of the 
partners have limited 
insight into the 
internal state of 
affairs, the decision-
making and evaluation 
Half of the partners 
have reasonable 
insight into the 
internal state of 
affairs, the decision-
making and evaluation 
Most partners have 
insight into the 
majority of the 
internal state of 
affairs, the decision-
making and evaluation 
All information 
regarding the internal 
state of affairs, the 
decision-making and 
evaluation process of 
the PPP is available 
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accessible to the 
partners.  
process of the PPP 
and this is difficult to 
access.    
  
process of the PPP 
and this is difficult to 
access.    
 
process of the PPP 
and this is easily 
accessible.    
and easily accessible 
for all partners. 
Deliberation 
 
There is no 
deliberation between 
the actors involved in 
the PPP about its state 
of affairs.  
Deliberation between 
one private and one 
public/civil society 
partner from the 
developed region 
occurs, but not on all 
relevant issues.  
Actors from both the 
public and private 
arena and civil society 
are involved in the 
deliberation process, 
however there is no 
proper communication 
between the partners 
from the developing 
and developed region.  
 
Actors from both the 
public and private 
arena and civil society 
from the developed 
and developing region 
are involved in the 
deliberation process, 
however deliberation 
does not occur on all 
relevant issues. 
 Actors from the 
public and private 
arena and civil society 
from both the 
developed and 
developing region are 
involved in 
systematically 
recurring deliberation 
on all relevant issues.  
Goal rationality The PPP does not 
have clearly indicated 
goals.  
The PPP has indicated 
its goals but the means 
are lacking.   
The PPP has indicated 
its goals and the 
means are identified, 
but they lack 
coherency.   
The PPP has indicated 
its goals and the 
means are identified, 
but only some are 
coherent, others are 
not.  
 
The PPP’s goals are 
clearly indicated, the 
means are identified 
and coherent with the 
goals.   
Effectiveness The PPP has not 
achieved any of its 
goals.  
The PPP has only 
achieved less than half 
of its goals.  
The PPP has achieved 
half of its goals.  
The PPP has achieved 
all of its goals.   
The PPP has achieved 
all of its goals and 
several unforeseen, 
positive side effects 
occurred.   
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Subsequently, the interviews will be analysed using textual analysis. This 
research method argues that texts should be used as sources for investigation. Language 
is not an objective reflection of reality, but it does indicate the perceptions and views 
one has about it. Therefore, textual analysis is argued to be a useful method to analyse 
the presence of varying ideas and principles on a particular topic (APSA: Qualitative 
Methods, 2004; McKee, 2003). It will allow for comparison of the partners’ perceptions 
of the PPP under study. Discourse analysis, as a subversion of textual analysis, will be 
applied in order to examine the interpretation of words in their context (APSA: 
Qualitative Methods, 2004). Qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA will be used 
to examine the interviews. Afterwards, the analysis will be send to the interviewees for 
an evaluation of accuracy of the content.  
 
Methodological challenges 
 The primary methodological challenge this research faces is that it compares the 
complete ODA system with merely three case of Public-Private Partnerships. This could 
result in a skewed comparison. However, the reason for this comparison is that a general 
overview of the legitimacy of PPPs for improving food security does not yet exist. 
Moreover, PPPs claim to be more efficient and effective than ODA in general, not 
merely than particular ODA projects. This is the reason why the three case studies will 
not be compared to three cases of ODA projects, because PPP do not only claim to be 
more legitimate than particular project, but they argue to be able to provide more 
effective and sustainable aid in general. Besides, also because of practical constraints, 
this comparison will not be made, as Public-Private Partnerships are created in those 
particular places where ODA projects do not develop effectively. Comparing a PPP with 
an ODA project in the same circumstances, is therefore practically very difficult.  
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1.6 Outline of the thesis 
As this research will compare the traditional ODA system with three cases of 
Public-Private Partnerships based on their legitimacy, both systems’ legitimacy will be 
examined. Using the indicators outlined above, the traditional ODA system will be 
assessed on its input and output legitimacy. This section will therefore answer the sub-
question as to how legitimate Official Development Assistance of food assistance in 
fragile states, actually is? Subsequently, the same assessment will be conducted 
concerning the three case studies. An overview of each of the PPPs will be provided, 
followed by an examination of their legitimacy, answering the second sub-question. 
This assessment makes it possible to draw conclusions on the requirements for a 
successful Public-Private Partnership. Finally, on the basis of these two assessment a 
comparison will be made between the two, answering the research question, whether 
public-private partnerships are legitimate policy instruments to improve food assistance 
in fragile states compared to ODA?  
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2 The current status of food assistance to 
fragile states in Africa  
As indicated in the graph underneath, food assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa 
largely exists of emergency food assistance. This is partly due to the high prevalence of 
fragile and emergency situations, caused by war and natural disasters among others, that 
the region is facing, but also because some countries that face chronic food insecurity 
now permanently receive this form of aid. Programme food assistance, as  explained 
before, has largely been replaced by project food assistance. In contrast to emergency 
food assistance, this latter, more sustainable form of aid has remained stable and even 
increased slightly since the start of the economic crisis in 2008, indicating the shifting 
focus on durable improvements in food security (World Food Programme, 2015). 
Moreover, in 2012 the majority of project food aid (66%) was delivered to Sub-Saharan 
Africa (World Food Programme, 2013:25).  
 
Figure 2.1: Food aid deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa (2001-2012) 
(Adopted from World Food Programme, 2013) 
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As there are no indications that there will be differences in the legitimacy indicators of 
project aid compared to overall development assistance, the legitimacy of food 
assistance in general will be assessed here. Moreover, solely examining project aid could 
result in including coincidences in the analysis, as there is no general picture of the 
legitimacy of project aid yet.  
2.1 Input legitimacy of food assistance 
Have these food assistance flows been legitimate? In order to assess and compare 
the traditional food assistance system with the PPPs in the case studies it will be 
examined on the basis of the legitimacy indicators outlined above. The traditional ODA 
system, especially when multilateral, scores relatively well on representativeness and 
inclusion. By their nature, multilateral organisations are formed between several nations 
and or organisations, thus governments and NGOs from both donor and recipient 
countries are involved in the provision of aid, as well as the decision-making process 
(Klingebiel, 2013:5). Unfortunately, there are some critical points to be raised 
concerning these positive levels of representativeness and inclusion of the ODA system. 
By definition, national governments are representative, provided that they are elected 
through fair and free elections by their constituents (Bevir, 2007: 828). In developing 
countries, elections might not always be free and fair, resulting in a government which 
does not fully represent its constituency. This might affect the representativeness and 
inclusion of the aid provision system, as the target group might not be properly 
represented in the multilateral organisation. 
Representativeness is also affected due to a decrease in the public support for 
ODA in donor countries. As a result of the increasing scrutiny of the effectiveness of 
aid, tax payers in donor countries started doubting ODA’s legitimacy. They wished to 
be informed about the allocation of their money in order to be certain that it was not 
misappropriated or wasted. The economic crisis has only further strengthened this 
critical public opinion. As tax payers suffered budgetary cuts in their own country they 
grew reluctant to uphold the 0.7% ODA/GNI commitment (Herfkens, 2011:15-16). 
Consequently, the representativeness and inclusion of the tax payers concerning the 
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allocation of development aid was negatively affected. A third point critics often raise 
is that donor countries could use development aid as a foreign-policy mechanism. 
Because these countries are able to provide more financial means they often have a 
larger say in the decision-making process in multilateral organisations. This tendency is 
even more present in bilateral aid. As many of the receiving countries are dependent on 
development aid, the donor country could use the allocation of the aid to its own benefit 
and enhance its own interests (Klingebiel, 2013:5).  
A final point of critique to be noted is that, although multilateral organisations 
engage various actors that are involved in, or influenced by, the provision of the aid, 
developing county-based civil society organisations (CSOs) are often not incorporated 
in the organisation and decision-making process. As indicated in the following graph, 
DAC members clearly prefer to fund donor country-based CSOs over other types of 
CSOs. In 2011, even ten times as much aid was funded through donor country-based 
CSOs than through developing country-based CSOs (OECD, 2013:8). This trend in 
consistent with NGOs active in the provision of food assistance. CARE, Catholic Relief 
Service and World Vision, the largest CSO providers of food assistance, are all based in 
the developed world. Consequently, this negatively affects the representativeness and 
inclusion of the target groups, since local civil society organisations usually have in 
depth knowledge about the local or national situation, where the assistance will be 
provided. They contribute “a first step towards a more complete answer to the 
intermediation problem between donors and recipients” (Martens, 2004:10). 
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Figure 2.2: ODA flows through CSO by type of CSO, 2011 
(Adopted from OECD, 2013: 8) 
 
 
 
Since recent years transparency in the ODA system has been high on the global, 
political agenda. During the 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation the stakeholders involved committed to improving the availability and 
accessibility of information regarding development cooperation. By the end of 2015 “a 
common standard for the electronic publication of data on development cooperation” is 
ought to be in place (OECD, 2012:2). In line with these international developments the 
World Food Programme initiated monthly publication of expenditure information 
regarding approximately 600 projects in over 90 countries. Moreover, since 2013 the 
organisation also started publishing estimated budgets and forward looking project 
information for the following years (International Aid Transparency, 2014:144-145).  
The urge to push for these common standards was caused by the increasing 
opacity that characterises the ODA system. This was partly caused by the high level of 
fragmentation in the system. According to the OECD, “fragmentation occurs when there 
are too many donors giving too little aid to too many countries” (OECD, 2015). The 
results of this can severely affect the effectiveness of aid, but can also increase 
transaction costs and lead to unnecessary bureaucratic trouble, because many different 
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donors, all with their own working modes and processes, are active in overlapping 
themes and regions. This is clearly indicated in Sub-Saharan Africa where the aid 
relationships quadrupled between 2000 and 2010. Unfortunately, only 60% of these 
were significant relationships (OECD, 2013c:30).  
Despite these efforts, transparency in the ODA system remains difficult to 
achieve. Currently, there are approximately 233 official multilateral aid organisations  
and between 6,000 and 30,000 NGOs active in developing countries, all of which work 
in (partly) overlapping fields. Bilateral aid and private organisations are yet to be added 
to these numbers and new players, such as China and Turkey, have entered the playing 
field as well (Kharas, 2007:15-16). Coordination of the aid thus remains extremely 
difficult, also because many of the new actors are no signatories to the Busan 
Partnership. Transparency is therefore a critical point for ODA.  
Fortunately, the ODA system providing food assistance is somewhat more 
transparent, since the large majority (99%) of multilateral food assistance is channelled 
through the WFP and the largest NGOs World Vision, CARE and Catholic Relief 
Service, who channel the largest share of food assistance to NGOs, work closely 
together with WFP (Mousseau, 2005: 20). Despite this relatively clear landscape of food 
aid organisations there are many small NGOs working outside of the scope of the WFP. 
Moreover, there is also a growing number of non-DAC members, such as India and 
China that are providing an increasing amount of bilateral food assistance (Harvey et al, 
2010:15-16).  
These critical points raised concerning representativeness, inclusion and 
transparency could also affect the level of deliberation in the system. High levels of 
inclusion and transparency could foster the deliberation process. Representation and 
involvement in the decision-making process and transparency into the internal affairs of 
the organisation are required in order for deliberation to take place. Deliberation 
involves exchanging information and opinions, increasing mutual understanding and 
therefore improving effective problem-solving (Verweij en Josling, 2003:10). When 
food aid is delivered through multilateral organisations, in theory, deliberation should 
take place, because these organisations provide forums where national governments and 
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NGOs can debate their stand on their shared interest, in this case the provision of food 
aid. 
Unfortunately, in practise, many multilateral institutions face skewed power 
relations, where certain national governments, which can provide for much of the 
financial means, will control the discussions and decision-making process (Keohane et 
al, 2009:23-24). It should be noted however, that it is difficult to assess to what extent 
deliberation processes are influenced by these skewed relations, all the more because 
there is little public information about the internal debates and consultation, which often 
also take place in an informal manner. The WFP’s Executive Board, for example, exists 
of 36 members who meet on a monthly basis. These members have been selected for a 
three-year term by ECOSOC together with the FAO (World Food Programme, 2014:7). 
However, little is known about the consultation of the other members outside the board, 
for example. Nonetheless, both organisations are actively working towards increasing 
consultation and deliberation with other actors in the field. The three UN organisations 
involved in food aid, for example, the FAO, IFAD and WFP, have improved their 
communication and deliberation over recent years. The heads of the organisations meet 
at least once a month in order to coordinate their efforts (Zwieten van, 2013:10). 
A final point of critique at the address of development organisations is that food 
assistance undermines the legitimacy of the recipient country’s government, because 
providing food is a public service that ought to be provided for by the national 
government, instead of international actors. According to the theory on the social 
contract between a state’s government and its constituency, the government is expected 
to provide public services in exchange for tax payment and political support. As donors 
have increasingly emphasised their role in the provision of the aid, this trade between 
the public and the government could be affected. Citizens lose confidence in the abilities 
of their government, which could result in a decrease of tax income and general 
compliance of the constituency (Dietrich and Winters, 2015:1, 7). 
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2.2 Output legitimacy of food assistance 
Also the output legitimacy of the food assistance system has been highly 
criticised. The goal rationality of the largest organisations providing food assistance is 
accounted for. The WFP’s mandate states that the organisation has a double aim 
providing food assistance in emergency situations, as well as support for economic and 
social development, aiding to improve food security (Zwieten van, 2013:4). The FAO’s 
overall aim is similar to the WFP’s, except that the FAO has a more long-term focus, 
intending to improve food security through development of the agricultural sector and 
rural communities, eventually “contributing towards an expanding world economy” 
(Food and Agricultural, 2013:3). It should be noted that these are long-term goals, to be 
met in many different regions, under varying circumstances, which makes it difficult to 
specify. Nonetheless, it is clear where both organisations work towards, and on that basis 
have indicated their means to achieve this.  
In contrast to goal rationality ODA’s level of effectiveness is less clear and 
therefore highly criticised. As outlined before, since the end of the 1990s much effort 
has been made to improve the effectiveness of food assistance or ODA in general. The 
World Bank defines aid effectiveness as: “the impact that aid has in reducing poverty 
and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity, and accelerating achievement of 
the Millennium Development Goals set by the international community”1 (World Bank, 
2015). Based on this definition measuring the effectiveness of the food assistance system 
would then require to examine the impact of food assistance in reducing food insecurity 
and speeding up the achievement of MDG 1.  
As pointed out before, the goal to reduce hunger by half has almost been reached 
on a global scale and MDG1 has thus almost been achieved. Unfortunately, these 
numbers do not necessarily hold true for Sub-Saharan Africa. As pointed out in the graph 
below, the prevalence of both malnutrition and undernourishment as a percentage of the 
population have both been steadily decreasing in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, 
                                                 
1 This definition has been compared to several others, most notably to those of the OECD and the FAO. The 
definition provided by the World Bank has been selected however, because its practical possibilities to be 
operationalized, as well as its reference to the Millennium Development Goals, which are currently high on the 
development agenda.  
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malnutrition only decreased from 29% in 1990 to 21% 2013 and also undernourishment 
only decreased with 7.5% instead of the expected 15% (World DataBank, 2015). 
Consequently, the progress in achieving MDG 1 in Sub-Saharan Africa does not run 
parallel with the global development. This supports the literature which states that the 
overall development of food security has been significantly lower in Sub-Saharan Africa 
where the majority of states are classified as fragile, compared to non-fragile developing 
countries (Alinovi et al, 2007; Breisinger et al, 2014; Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011; 
Ishihara, 2012).  
 
Figure 3.3: Prevalence of malnutrition and undernourishment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (1990-2012) 
(Adapted from World DataBank, 2015) 
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Although malnutrition and undernourishment are important factors indicating the 
level of food security, the multifaceted nature of the concept of food security asks for a 
more in depth approach. Food security is too complex a concept to be measured by two 
indicators. Therefore, in order to test the effectiveness of food assistance, the progress 
that has been made in improving food security as a whole in Africa will also be assessed 
on the basis of the four indicators of food security, namely availability, accessibility, 
utilization and stability. Each of these indicators has several attributes which together 
provide a thorough assessment of the indicator’s progress.  
Food availability is measured by, among others, the value of the food production 
per capita, the average protein supply and the dietary energy supply adequacy. This latter 
factor “expresses the dietary energy supply as a percentage of the average dietary energy 
requirement” (Food and Agricultural, 2013b:76). This number has been increasing 
significantly throughout the previous two decades. 1992 was taken as reference point 
after which the value increased to 110% since 2011, indicating that since 1992 the ability 
to meet the average dietary energy requirement by the supply has increased by 10% 
(FAOSTAT, 2015). Also the average value of food production has slowly been 
increasing, both in Africa as well as Sub-Saharan Africa, more specifically. This factor 
is an indicator for the economic size of the food production sector in the region. Again, 
there exists a clear difference between Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. While the value 
of the food production increased with 15% in Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa only 
experienced a 7.3% growth (FAOSTAT, 2015). Finally, also the average protein supply 
has slowly increased throughout recent years from 52 gram per capita per day in 1990 
to 58 gram per capita per day in 2011. Unfortunately, as to a global increase of 13%, 
Africa is lagging behind compared to other regions (FAOSTAT, 2015).  
Stability of food is and food prices is a second, and very important indicator of 
food security, that has been highly volatile during recent years. Price swings and 
shortfall in the food supply could have harmful effects on national and household level 
food security. On the demand side, households are forced to adjust their immediate food 
intake, however, they also need to be prepared for potential fluctuations in the future by 
saving more. Especially poor households will be affected by the food and price volatility 
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as they spend a relatively large proportion of their income on food. Also the supply side 
will be affected by volatility, because the business and investment risk will increase 
(Food and Agricultural, 2013b:82). 
Also the national or country level suffers from volatile food prices, especially 
when the national economy is highly integrated with the international market, because 
price fluctuations make it difficult to create foreign exchange through export. The value 
of food imports over total merchandise exports indicates a country’s ability to finance 
the import of food through its export products and services. A country’s inability to 
finance its food import through its exports becomes problematic when the prices on the 
international food market rise, making it difficult for a country to satisfy its food 
demand, and taking away funding from other sectors as well, which is now allocated to 
the purchase of food. In Africa the value of food imports over total merchandise exports 
has decreased from 16% in 1995 to merely 9% in 2007. In recent years the continent has 
been better able to finance its imports through its exports, however the percentage 
remains 10% to 11%, negatively affecting its food security status (FAOSTAT, 2015).  
As can be seen in the following graph, food prices in Africa as a whole and Sub-
Saharan Africa more specifically, have been highly volatile since the turn of the century. 
The region has been highly affected by price fluctuations, especially as a result of the 
food crisis in 2008. The year following this crisis the food price volatility index in Sub-
Saharan Africa increased from 9.1 to 17.0 in order to drop to 3.8 a year later. Only the 
previous two years the volatility has stabilised (FAOSTAT, 2015).  
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Figure 3.4: Domestic food price volatility in Africa and  
Sub-Saharan Africa (2000-2014)  
(FAOSTAT, 2015) 
  
 
  Food price fluctuations can also significantly affect the access to food, as high 
food prices will lead to an increased share of the income to be spend on food. To measure 
the value of the purchase of food in the overall household expenditures the domestic 
food price index is used. This index will be high for developing countries. 
Unfortunately, due to the volatility of global food prices during the previous years, this 
index has increased substantially from 1.83 in 2000 to 2.18 in 2013 indicating that the 
Africans need to spend a significantly larger share of their income on food than 10 or 
15 years ago (FAOSTAT, 2015). Besides economic accessibility, also physical access 
to food is an important aspect of food accessibility. Adequate infrastructure is often 
lacking in Africa, though important in facilitating economic activities and the 
distribution of food. Unfortunately, there is very little data available measuring the road 
and railway density and status on the African continent. However, it is to say that in 
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most African countries these values are very low and below 30% of roads are paved 
(Food and Agricultural, 2013b:78-79).  
Finally, the progress of food utilisation in Africa is measured by examining the 
access to improved sanitation facilities and water sources. In order for the body to absorb 
minerals and nutrients a good health is required. Therefore, access to proper water and 
sanitation facilities affects the individual’s ability to consume food. Unfortunately, 
Africa remains the continent with the highest percentage of  the population without 
access to water sources and sanitation facilities (Food and Agricultural, 2013b:80). On 
a global level, there has been a decline of 24% of people living without access to water 
sources since 1990 and the relevant MDG concerning this topic has already been 
reached. However, this picture does not hold for Africa where the proportion of the 
population with access to drinking water only increased from 55.1% to 68.7% in the 
same period. The same accounts for access to sanitation facilities, which increased from 
33.9% in 1990 to 39.4% in 2012. The values for Sub-Saharan Africa, again are 
significantly lower. Here, 29.9% of the population had access to sanitation facilities in 
2012 and 64.9% to clean water sources (FAOSTAT, 2015) 
 
2.3 Concluding remarks 
On the basis of these indicators it is possible to give a detailed description of the 
legitimacy of the traditional ODA system providing food assistance. ODA scores well 
on representativeness (score = 4), since the WFP and the FAO, who provide the majority 
of the food assistance, are both multilateral agencies incorporating governments from 
both the developed and developing world. However, there is a lack of representation of 
the target group through the inadequate involvement of local civil society organisations. 
This is also reflected in the system’s level of inclusion. Because of the multilateral nature 
of the aid system it is expected that all the stakeholders are included in the decision-
making process. Both the WFP and the FAO rotating board members, who all have an 
equal say in managing the organisations. Unfortunately, it can be concluded that despite 
this organisational set up stakeholders and target groups in the developing world are 
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underrepresented in the decision-making process, as a result of a lack of collaboration 
with local NGOs. Therefore, ODA scores average on inclusion (score = 3).  
Transparency has been a highly criticised point and has been high on the 
development agenda in recent years. Consequently, most international organisations 
providing food assistance are now publishing their internal reports and forward plans. 
However, transparency as a result of fragmentation remains a point of critique and 
makes it extremely difficult to coordinate all the organisations active in the field. 
Although the food assistance system is somewhat less fragmented, because of the 
coordinating role of the WFP, there is a growing number of small NGOs who do not fall 
under its realm. Moreover, bilateral food assistance is also increasingly being provided 
by countries who are no signatories to the Busan Agreement, therefore not necessarily 
committed to its rules. As a result, transparency remains a critical point (score = 2). This 
also affects the level of deliberation between the actors involved. Fortunately, overall, 
the communication between, as well as within food assistance organisations occurs 
frequently. The large multilateral organisations have regular meetings and discuss their 
policy with their members. Moreover, since recently, the main players IFAD, WFP and 
FAO have also stepped up their communication and cooperation concerning their 
activities. Therefore, the ODA system scores well on deliberation (score = 4).  
The traditional ODA system scores well on goal rationality (score = 5). The goals 
are clearly indicated, improving food security, and the actors are actively working 
towards achieving these goals. However, whether their efforts have been effective is 
debatable. The nature of the World Bank’s definition of aid effectiveness requires 
caution in drawing conclusions, because who is to say that high or low levels of 
development could not have been caused by external factors such as natural disasters, 
corruption or economic growth? This makes it difficult to assess its effectiveness. It 
could be argued, however, that overall, important improvements have taken place and 
food security has improved over the past two decades. However, this progress have been 
slow, especially compared to other developing regions, where food security has been 
improving more rapidly. Moreover, progress has also been characterised significant 
variation among African countries in progress, as well as between the indicators. For 
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example, in most countries high availability of food is associated with low levels of 
undernourishment. However, in Egypt, Benin, Malawi and Niger, among others dietary 
supply adequacy varies between 110 to 140, while the proportion of stunted children 
under age 5 ranged between 20 to 45% of the population (Food and Agricultural, 
2013b:76). These results could point to the presence of particular groups suffering from 
acute undernourishment, but also to the skewed distribution or targeting of the food 
assistance to these countries. Consequently, effectiveness requires significant 
improvement (score = 2). 
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3 Analysis: legitimacy of three Public-
Private Partnerships for food security in 
Africa 
All three case studies, which have been selected for this research, have been part 
of the Schokland Agreement. In June 2007, the Dutch Minister for Development 
Cooperation and Trade initiated a large event to bring together civil society, public and 
private actors in order to combine efforts to optimize the Dutch contribution to achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. 36 agreements got signed and another 
2000 individuals pledged their support to the agreements. This event became known as 
the Pact of Schokland. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs created the Schokland Fund, a 
subsidy framework which translated the Pact into concrete regulation. In 2008 27 
projects were selected to become part of the Schokland Agreement and another 26 got 
selected in 2010. All partnerships are made up of cross-sectorial partners and the 
Ministry is an active partner in each of them. All are concerned with one or more of the 
MDGs (Van Gerwen and Van Ede, 2014:11-13).  
MDG1, concerned with poverty reduction and food security, includes the largest 
amount of projects. In total, 5 out of the 54 projects focus on food security, making it 
one of the largest categories (Van Gerwen and Van Ede, 2014:33). This is no surprise, 
as food security is one of the focus areas of the Dutch development policy. Annually, it 
spends approximately 350 million euro on improving food and nutrition security. 
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “food and nutrition security is achieved if 
adequate food (quantity, quality, safety, socio-cultural acceptability) is available and 
accessible for, and satisfactorily utilized by, all individuals at all times to live a healthy 
and happy life” (Ministry of Foreign, 2013:4). Although the Ministry was already 
engaged in several Public-Private Partnership, the Schokland Agreement led the way to 
an increased focus on development-oriented partnerships in Dutch policy (Van Gerwen 
and Van Ede, 2014:11-13).  
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3.1. Case studies 
3.1.1. Increase food security and improve livelihoods of sorghum and rice 
producers 
 
Background 
This partnership was established in 2001 between international beer brewer 
Heineken and the European Cooperative for Rural Development (EUCORD). EUCORD 
is a Belgian-based non-profit organisation, which seeks to cooperate with the private 
sector in order to develop rural communities through training, creating value chains and 
farmer organizations (Sopov et al, 2014:14). The partnership was already established 
before the Schokland Agreement, from personal contacts at the managerial level 
between Heineken and EUCORD. During an event organised by the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, which aimed at bringing together actors from the private sector and 
civil society, the partners decided to cooperate in their mutual interest in local sourcing. 
Heineken has a long-standing history in Africa and a growing interest for local sourcing, 
which would be beneficial for both the company as well as the local region, therefore 
contributing to economic development (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). EUCORD, 
in turn, had expertise in working with the private sector for rural, agricultural 
development projects for several years. When Tom de Man, (Heineken’s former 
Regional President for Africa and the Middle East) was asked by Sierra Leone’s 
President to invest in local farmers and agriculture EUCORD was invited to examine 
the possibilities (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview). Three years later the partners 
launched pilot projects in Sierra Leone and Ghana.  
These countries were selected because of practical reasons. Due to the personal 
relations between Tom de Man and Henk Knipscheer (Senior Advisor at EUCORD), 
and their contacts in Sierra Leone, this country was a logical starting-point. Ghana was 
selected mostly because EUCORD was vested there, but also because Heineken was 
already actively pursuing local sourcing there. Both projects were perceived as great 
successes. On average, the participating farmers’ incomes doubled within the first three 
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years after the project’s initiation (Knipscheer, 2015:personal interview). As a result, 
the partners applied for additional funding from the Schokland Pact and their efforts got 
extended to Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, two so called ‘partner 
countries’ of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The projects in Sierra Leone and 
Ghana where concluded in 2009 and 2010 respectively. As a result, the Pact of 
Schokland should not only be seen as the initiator of the partnership, but also as an 
accelerator (Van Gerwen and Van Ede, 2014:107). 
The projects in Burundi and DRC started in 2010 and varied widely in scope and 
success. Both countries were ´partner countries´ of the Dutch government, meaning that 
there is a special relationship between the two with regard to development coopeation. 
Heineken has also been actively brewing beer here for decades. In DRC these activities 
occurred on a large scale, as beer brewer Bralima, owned by Heineken International, 
operates six different plants. Consequently, the project in DRC had a significant impact 
and grew to include 57,355 families. In Burundi, Heineken´s operating company Brarudi 
only has two production locations and the project reached 10,852 families (Van Gerwen 
and Van Ede, 2014:42). The crops were selected on the basis of their benefit for both 
the breweries as well as for the local producers. Therefore, in DRC the partners decided 
to use rice as a raw material for the production of beer. In Burundi sorghum was selected. 
(Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview).  
In 2012, the project got enlarged as the Schokland Agreement got a follow up 
and significant upscale by means of the Community Revenue Enhancement through 
Agricultural Technology Extension (CREATE) programme. As a result of the success 
of the projects in DRC and Burundi, three more partner countries were selected in which 
Heineken has local breweries. These were Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia 
(Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview). Sierra Leone got included a second time, 
because of the growth of the local sorghum market, which would provide the brewery 
with sufficient raw materials for its beer production. During the first project phase, the 
brewery had long been unable to obtain sufficient raw materials, so the enlargement of 
the market was a requirement for the renewal of the project (Knipscheer, 2015: personal 
interview). Ethiopia was particularly interesting for Heineken, because of its significant 
growth of the national beer consumption. Moreover, as one of the few African countries, 
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Ethiopia has the right climate for the production of barley (Knipscheer, 2015: personal 
interview).   
 
Partners’ goals and motives 
The partnership aims at improving food security and livelihoods of local grain 
producers. This is done by developing a local supply chain, in which small-holder 
farmers produce raw materials for Heineken’s local brewery and the local market. The 
farmers are trained by EUCORD on the cultivation of crops such as maize, rice and 
sorghum, among others, and are provided with high quality and high yielding grain 
varieties, which enables them to improve their harvest. Consequently, it is expected that 
they will have more food to consume. Moreover, the farmers are also expected to have 
more disposable income, because their yield surplus can be sold on the local market 
and/or to Heineken’s local brewery. As a result, of the increased availability of food on 
the local markets, the food availability of the wider community will also increase 
(Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview).  
These expectations are based on Heineken’s policy around local sourcing, which 
means that, by 2020, Heineken’s beer brewing plants acquire at least 60% of their raw 
materials locally, instead of importing these from abroad. By doing so, the company will 
create a market for the local farmers (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). The long-term 
goal is to create a self-sustaining supply chain “where the added value in the chain is 
shared, so that the farmer makes enough money to make it worthwhile to replant and 
resell again, the middle-men and other businesses all maintain their profit and we can 
still buy the end product at a price which is economically viable for us as well” (Stanger, 
2015: personal interview). Eventually, the efforts of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and EUCORD in this partnership would become redundant as the farmers will 
be able to maintain the supply chain and provide raw materials to the brewery.  
The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and EUCORD are both involved in this 
partnership, because of the developmental aspect. Both believe in the potential for long-
term economic growth by fostering partnership between civil society, the public and 
private sector. Cooperating in this partnership allows both to aid in creating sustainable 
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improvement in the food security of local farmers in Africa (Knipscheer, 2015: personal 
interview; Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview). As Middelhoff (2015: personal 
interview) pointed out: “cooperating on this level will allow for a larger project reach, 
more families will be involved, which results in a greater multiplier effect for the local 
economy”. EUCORD is primarily focussed on benefiting the farmer’s interest. Its aims 
to improve the livelihoods of farmer families by creating sustainable value chains with 
the private sector, in order to develop the rural communities. As a result of Heineken´s 
involvement in the partnership, the market for the farmer´s produce is guaranteed. 
Therefore, farmers are now willing to invest in crops that used to be primarily employed 
for household consumption and, with the aid of EUCORD, transform them into cash 
crops, leaving the farmers with higher yield as well as more income. This guaranteed 
market was therefore an important motivation for EUCORD to become involved in the 
partnership as it significantly improves the possibility to effectively develop local 
farmer communities (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview). The Ministry has a wider 
perspective as it aims at increasing the overall food security and development of the 
region, in order to work towards achieving Millennium Goal 1 (Middelhoff, 2015: 
personal interview). Heineken also has this developmental aspect in mind and is 
logically also business-oriented.  
With respect to its business approach it has the following interests. First, 
investing in this project significantly shortens the supply chain for Heineken. Instead of 
importing its raw materials from Europe or North America, the breweries can now 
obtain their products locally. This increases their flexibility to adapt to sudden changes 
in the market. Second, when the raw materials are produced locally, the production costs 
will be high, due to the small-holder farmers’ capacity, but the transportation costs 
remain low. Taking into account that there is a lot of potential for these farmers to 
increase their capacity and grow their production, the brewery’s cost structure can 
decrease (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). The costs will further be decreased by the 
fact that through local importation of raw materials, the brewery can circumvent costs 
involved with the exchange of currency (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview). 
Consequently, local sourcing will be more cost-effective.  
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Another motive for Heineken to become involved in this partnership is that it 
creates a positive dialogue between the brewery and the African ministries of Finance 
and Agriculture. For example, Heineken has conversations not only with the finance 
minister who wants to increase the tax on beer, but also with the agricultural minister. 
Virtually every Africa economy2 is for 70% to 80% reliant on agriculture, which mainly 
consists of small-holder farmers (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). Increasing the tax 
on beer would decrease Heineken’s profit, which makes it more difficult for the 
company to invest in the local agriculture. “We have a dual responsibility. We have the 
commercial benefits that we want to deliver, but it is also very much in our interest that 
farmers improve their practices and increase their yield as this will generate income. 
This will benefit the local economic. If the economy grows and people have more 
disposable income then more people can afford to make the step from homemade beer 
into commercially brewed beer” (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). 
 
Organisational set up 
As becomes evident from the above, this partnership is a clear business-driven 
case. The official partnership exists between Heineken and the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Both partners bring in 50% of the financial means. The Ministry 
channels these through Heineken, which contributes partly in cash and partly in-kind. 
Heineken, in turn, contracts EUCORD. Together, the Ministry, Heineken and EUCORD 
operate a steering group from the Netherlands and from Brussels, where the partners 
meet to discuss the PPPs general policy regarding the projects in the various countries. 
This is done on the basis of equality of the partners; EUCORD brings its technical and 
agronomical expertise to the table, the Ministry its contacts and knowledge of and 
experience with development projects, and Heineken its experience in doing business in 
Africa (Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview). 
Heineken provides the market for the farmers and together with EUCORD selects 
the farmer communities and the crop that will be used. Based on Heineken’s demand, 
EUCORD contracts and organises farmers to initiate cultivating grains for the brewery. 
                                                 
2 With the exception of South Africa. 
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The farmers are supplied with improved grain varieties and receive training on how to 
effectively cultivate their land and increase their yield. EUCORD also teaches them to 
be more business-oriented, in order to know when to sell the produce and to whom. 
Finally, the farmers get educated on nutrition and HIV/AIDS. These workshops are not 
solely executed by EUCORD. The NGO educates local field extension agents among 
small-holder farmers to assist them. This, in order for the project to become self-
sustaining. During harvest EUCORD assists the farmers in collecting the yield and 
delivering it to the brewery (Hueskens, 2013:7). The Ministry, together with the local 
embassies, assists the partners with its network of government representatives and its 
knowledge about local NGOs and other third parties that are involved in the partnership, 
when required. As Stanger (2015: personal interview) pointed out: “the local embassy’s 
network and contacts are very important. If I want to do something in region X, the local 
embassies are the ones that I will be asking: Which is the right NGO to be talking to?”.  
Besides the relationship between the partners on the managerial level, they also 
cooperate on a local or in-country level. The majority of the local executive decisions 
are being made at this level, primarily between local representatives of EUCORD and 
the local brewery (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview). These breweries, such as 
Bralima in DRC, have a fairly independent status, since Heineken prefers not to 
micromanage (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). Therefore, the breweries have a 
relatively large voice in the day-to-day decision-making process. They set the markets 
for the farmers, who will then be trained and equipped with crop varieties by EUCORD. 
The local embassies in turn are the ones who maintain contacts with local government 
representatives, but also with other third parties and NGO’s, which are sometimes 
contracted by EUCORD for their expertise in a particular field. Moreover, they assist 
EUCORD with technical advice through the embassies’ agricultural counsels, consisting 
of embassy staff with expertise in agricultural practises (Middelhoff, 2015: personal 
interview).  
EUCORD also aims at creating an advisory committee in each of the project 
countries. These committees are comprised of value chain stakeholders. Normally one 
or two government representatives, for example from the Ministry of Agriculture, are 
involved, a person from the finance or banking world and someone from an agricultural 
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knowledge institute. Preferably, several of these persons have a background in farming, 
however there is no formal representation of the farmers in these committees 
(Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview).  
 
Legitimacy of the partnership 
 Based on the above, it is possible to make an analysis of this PPP’s legitimacy. 
The partnership allows for a proper representation of almost all of its stakeholders. Two 
private actors are involved, Heineken International and the local brewery, at least one 
civil society actor, in this case EUCORD is represented, however, frequently other 
NGO’s are attracted too, and public actors from both the developed country, the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the developing country, through the local government 
and national ministries, are represented. As a result, this partnership scores well on 
representativeness. It should be noted, however, that local governments and NGOs or 
other third parties do not form part of the official partnership. Moreover, local farmers 
are not be sufficiently represented, nor included. They are not embodied by a farmer’s 
cooperation, for example. Only through meetings with EUCORD they can voice their 
opinion about the project’s policies.  
 With regards to the level of inclusion of the partnership, it should be noted that 
not all of the stakeholders mentioned above take part in the decision-making process. 
Stanger (2015: personal interview) pointed out that this is also a consequence of the 
“need for speed and momentum”, especially when it concerns short-term decisions. As 
mentioned before, the general policy is set on a managerial level by Heineken, 
EUCORD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the executive decisions are being 
made on a local level, mostly between these three partners, and regularly in collaboration 
with third parties (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). However, through the steering 
committees local stakeholders in the value chain do have the opportunity to influence 
the decisions being made, as EUCORD and the local brewery consult them for their 
agronomical and economic experience and expertise (Knipscheer, 2015: personal 
interview).  
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 As a result, there is a fair share of deliberation and transparency between the 
partners. Despite what the contract might suggest, there exists little to no hierarchy 
between the partners. It is to say that Heineken is in the lead in this partnership, but the 
decisions are being made in consultation with each other. Each partner has an equal say 
in the decision-making process and can suggest policy or procedural changes. Moreover, 
all have access to the same information (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview; 
Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview; Stanger, 2015: personal interview). The partners 
at the managerial level meet on a regular basis. Officially, there is a monthly call, a 
quarterly meeting and a six-month review in which the project is evaluated and possible 
adjustments to the policy are being made. Besides these scheduled meetings, there is 
regular phone and mail contact as well. On the executive level, on the other hand, the 
partners are regularly communicating about the day-to-day state of affairs (Stanger, 
2015: personal interview).  
 Despite this equal status of the partners, there is a more hierarchical method in 
place with regards to taking responsibility of one’s actions. Officially, EUCORD has to 
report to Heineken and both, in turn are held accountable by the Ministry. Together with 
Heineken, EUCORD writes an annual report and a forward plan that is controlled by a 
representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). 
Normally, these reports do not contain many surprises, because of the transparency 
between the partners. This adds to a valuable level of trust, which adds to the  
partnership’s effectiveness (Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview).  
 Because several of the projects are relatively new (Ethiopia and Rwanda) and 
most of them are still on-going, it is somewhat difficult to completely assess the PPPs 
effectiveness, all the more because of the variation between the countries. As mentioned 
before, the goal is to develop sustainable local supply chains in order for the brewery to 
obtain at least 60% of its raw materials locally (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). The 
means to achieve this goal are clearly indicated, as EUCORD is the partner mostly 
concerned with the execution hereof. Unfortunately, this starts with whether the brewery 
is actively working towards achieving this goal. According to Knipscheer (2015: 
personal interview) this was one of the reasons the project in DRC was a success since 
its initiation, while it struggled in Burundi.   
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 The project in DRC has been successful. Heineken’s subsidiary Bralima signed 
66 contracts with local suppliers who purchase and assemble the rice produced by the 
small-holder farmers. The majority of the farmers, trained by EUCORD, indicated to 
have greater confidence to invest in the production of rice. Consequently, the average 
yield per hectare has increased 20% and the average marketed surplus even grew with 
60%. Food security of the families involved increased significantly as well, with 67% 
of the households consuming two meals a day in 2012, as to 58% before the start of the 
project three years earlier (Hueskens, 2013:4-5). Currently, the brewer’s total demand 
for rice is covered by local small-holder farmers. As a result, the project ended 
successfully and has now been taken over by BRALIMA, which continued to contract 
EUCORD. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is no longer formally involved, as the supply 
chain is almost completely self-sustaining (Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview). 
 The project in Burundi was less effective from the onset and Heineken stood at a 
critical point whether to continue with its investments. This was due to several reasons. 
First, because EUCORD was not yet officially registered in the country, it took several 
months to have this arranged, which meant that the NGO could only take up activities 
afterwards. Second, the process of finding the right crop which could be used by the 
brewery, and that grew well in the Burundese climate and was relevant for the local 
market, was very time-consuming. After looking into rice and maize, the partners 
decided to produce sorghum. Unfortunately, the sorghum varieties that already grew in 
Burundi were unfit for the beer production and their yields were too low. Therefore, new 
varieties were tested by EUCORD in cooperation with the agricultural institute of the 
University of Burundi, on their applicability and suitability for the local farmers 
(Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview). After this process was concluded, it took several 
months to register the new variety at the Burundese Ministry of Agriculture (Middelhoff, 
2015: personal interview).  
 Despite the difficult start of the project, it has now grown significantly, as a result 
of the successful introduction of the 100% sorghum beer, Nyongera, by Brarudi. 
Currently, approximately 2,000 farmers are involved in four different provinces. By the 
end of the project period in 2017 around 8,000 farmers are expected to be involved. The 
new sorghum varieties, aided by the technological training from EUCORD produce on 
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average 2 to 3 ton of sorghum per hectare, compared to merely 0,5 ton for the local 
varieties. Sorghum remains the priority crop, but the production of rice is also being 
considered because of its relevance on the local market, therefore widening the scope of 
the project and further improving household food security. This is a critical point, since 
sorghum remains a less preferred food crop in Burundi compared to maize, rice and 
cassava (Sopov et al, 2014:18-22). However, as a result of the project, the government 
of Burundi is progressively recognizing the importance of sorghum as both a food and 
a cash crop and is stimulating support programmes in order to further utilize its potential 
(Van Gerwen and Van Ede, 2014:110). 
The three newest projects under the CREATE programme are too young to draw 
strong conclusions on their effectiveness. The project in Ethiopia, however, is looking 
promising, because of the significant potential for growth in the market. Rwanda, on the 
other hand, experienced similar problems as Burundi. Again, EUCORD was not yet 
registered and it was difficult to find the right crop. After having looked into the 
production of sorghum and rice, eventually, it has been decided to grow maize. Lastly, 
the project in Sierra Leone has been interrupted, due to the ebola outbreak in the summer 
of 2014. The project is expected to restart again this summer (Middelhoff, 2015: 
personal interview).  
Overall however, it could be argued that this PPP is rather successful in creating 
an effective value chain. The PPP scores well on both the input and output legitimacy 
indicators. The largest improvement could be made concerning inclusion and goal 
rationality. The local farmers are only limitedly represented and included in the 
decision-making process. They could voice their opinion through EUCORD and the 
steering committees, but this is merely on a subordinate basis. Moreover, the local 
governments are also barely incorporated in the decision-making process. For a PPP to 
be a legitimate instrument it is important to incorporate the local stakeholders in the 
decision-making process. After all, they are the ones affected by the project. The 
partnership’s goal rationality could be improved as well, because the means to reach the 
goals are not always sufficiently addressed by the local brewers, depending on the 
management in place. In Ethiopia, for example, the brewery was highly supportive of 
the project, while in Burundi, the brewery initially stood hesitant towards cooperation 
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with civil society and was reserved in collaborating with EUCORD. However, at the 
moment, also this collaboration appears to be successful (Knipscheer, 2015: personal 
interview).  
 Besides these organisational improvements, it remains difficult to draw strong 
conclusions on the improvement of food security in the project regions and assess 
whether the multiplier effect actually appeared. As mentioned earlier, in Burundi, for 
example, the crop being used for the production of beer, sorghum, is less preferred by 
local households as a food crop. Instead, maize, rice, beans and cassava are favoured, 
reducing the project’s influence on local food security (Sopov et al, 2014:22). A similar 
issue is of importance in DRC, where rice is cultivated for Heineken’s subsidiaries. 
However, rice is primarily consumed by the upper and higher middle class. The 
underprivileged primarily eat cassava (Knipsheer, 2015: personal interview). Despite 
these remarks, it should be pointed out that food security has improved on average in 
both DRC and Burundi. In DRC the amount of people consuming just one meal daily 
decreased in all project sites and the majority now consumes two meals a day (Hueskens, 
2013:20). Strong conclusions about food security in the other countries cannot yet be 
drawn, as they are still in an early phase.  
Overall, the partnership is working effectively towards its goals in a transparent 
and deliberative manner. Furthermore, there are two positive side effects to be pointed 
out. First, after Heineken other international brewers such as Diageo and SABMiller 
have started local sourcing as well, and second, there is a considerable influx of families 
moving to the project regions, eager to benefit from the partnership (Knipscheer, 2015: 
personal interview). It should be pointed out, however, that this influx could also put 
pressure on the land, thus eventually negatively impacting the yield (Middelhoff, 2015: 
personal interview).  
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3.1.2. Helping farmers produce cassava for profit  
 
Background 
This partnership, also called ´Cassava+’, got established in 2009 between the 
International Fertilizer Development Centre (IDFC) and  the Dutch Agricultural 
Development and Trading company (DADTCO). IFDC is a US-based, international, 
non-profit organisation, which aims to improve developing countries’ agricultural sector 
by means of providing agribusiness and technological expertise (International Fertilizer 
Development, 2015). DADTCO is a young company, established in 2002, which 
focusses on agricultural development through creating “innovative technologies and 
business models for commercial development of crop processing” (Dutch Agricultural 
Development, 2015). Both partners met during the Pact of Schokland. DADTCO had 
been active for some time already in Nigeria with its new technology to process cassava. 
IFDC recognized the potential this crop had to offer for small-holder farmers and was 
interested in cooperating in a Public-Private Partnership (De Jager, 2015: personal 
interview).  
Although being one of Africa’s main food crops cassava is primarily produced 
by small-holder farmers for private consumption. The root remains exceptionally 
resistant against the dry climate many African regions face. It is possible to produce 
cassava even on marginal soils where other crops, such as sorghum and maize, are 
unable to grow. Moreover, cassava does not need to be harvested within a short time 
frame. Instead, it can remain in the ground unharvested for one and a half to two years, 
making it significantly useful as a subsistence crop (Calon, 2015: personal interview; 
De Jager, 2015: personal interview). Unfortunately, despite these beneficial 
characteristics, approximately 90% of the cassava in Africa is home-consumed 
(International Fertilizer Development, 2013:1).  
This is mostly due to the crop’s high perishability. Cassava needs to be processed 
into a stable commodity within 48 hours after being harvested or it will deteriorate (De 
Jager, 2015: personal interview). Recognizing this unfavourable trait, but also seeing 
cassava’s potential on the local, national and international market, as the crop can be a 
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substitute for wheat flour, glucose and starch, DADTCO developed the Autonomous 
Mobile Processing Unit (AMPU) (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:2). 
Instead of transporting the cassava towards the processing site, these AMPUs can be 
transported to the production sites, making it possible for the farmers to have their 
cassava processed within 48 hours. The AMPUs transform the cassava roots into High 
Quality Cassava Cake (HQCC), which can be stored and saved for further processing. 
This is an important development as it makes it possible for cassava to be used for 
economic and industrial purposes, instead of largely remaining a subsistence crop. 
However, as the HQCC is not the final product, it is necessary to contract an industrial 
actor as end, who process the cakes and thus provides the market for the produce (Calon, 
2015: personal interview). In Nigeria the roots were transformed into flour, while in 
Ghana and Mozambique it is used for the production of cassava-based beer 
(International Fertilizer Development, 2013:2-3).  
The Schokland Pact provided the partners with an opportunity to further develop 
DADTCO’s efforts in Nigeria. DADTCO had already been active there since 2002, 
when the Nigerian government, under the Presidential Initiative for Cassava, had 
decided that at least 10% of the flour used for the production of bakery products ought 
to be derived from cassava (Calon, 2015: personal interview). This offered potential for 
the development of local value chains, and with the help of the Schokland Fund 
DADTCO and IFDC decided to cooperate in order to work towards this goal. IFDC 
would train the farmers in cultivating cassava and improving their yield and DADTCO 
would provide the market and processing of the cassava after harvest. In 2009, 
DADTCO initiated a market assessment in order to develop a solid marketing plan as to 
start local interventions together with IFDC. Five regions with high clusters of cassava 
farmers were selected, including 1.195 farmers in 2012 supplying 4.457 metric tons of 
cassava roots to the AMPUs (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:6). 
Unfortunately, due to several internal and external factors the project got terminated 
before its end-date (De Jager, 2015: personal interview).  
First of all, the Presidential Initiative for Cassava was not enforced properly, due 
to lobbying activities of government representatives who benefited more from the 
importation of wheat than from locally grown cassava. This significantly affected the 
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flour market and reduced the demand for cassava. Consequently, it was difficult for 
DADTCO to find a market for the farmers’ produce. This got hindered further when in 
one production site the starch factory had to be closed due to factors beyond control of 
DADTCO (De Jager, 2015: personal interview). Also political frictions aided to the 
external factors, as the production sites were located near areas in which terrorist 
organisation Boko Haram gained ground (Calon, 2015: personal interview).      
Besides these external factors, some internal frictions also thwarted the 
cooperation between the partners. First, there was no clear agreement on each partner’s 
roles and responsibilities in the project. The contract regarding the PPP got signed 
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and IFDC. DADTCO was only officially 
involved in the partnership through a memorandum of understanding with IFDC, which 
lacked a detailed description of the roles and responsibilities of each partner. Initially, 
when both partners were enthusiastic and eager to embark on the project, this did not 
cause any frictions. However, due to the external setbacks these issues rose to the surface 
and affected the communication between the partners (Calon, 2015: personal interview; 
De Jager, 2015: personal interview).  
This became clearly visible with regards to the planning of the stationing of the 
AMPUs. As cassava requires a year to a year and a half to grow, IFDC is expected to 
start training the famers approximately two years before the arrival of the AMPU. 
Consequently, the stationing of the AMPUs needs to be planned accordingly. Due to 
changes in the market, among others, it has occurred that DADTCO eventually had to 
adjust its plans, which left the farmers without a market for their produce. This resulted 
in frictions between DADTCO and IFDC, because the latter felt it had to take 
responsibility and inform the farmers. Moreover, it proved difficult to make long-term 
agreements, as the DADTCO management was perceived to take “ad hoc decisions from 
time to time”, partially because it is a relatively small and young company, which 
rendered it less capable to cope with economic setbacks (De Jager, 2015: personal 
interview). Because the roles and responsibilities were not clearly defined, these 
circumstances thwarted the cooperation between the partners.  
Despite these developments, in 2011, the partners decided to renew cooperation. 
Taking the lessons learned into account and incorporating DADTCO as a signatory 
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partner to the contract, the partners established a project in Mozambique, which got 
extended to Ghana a year later. As part of the follow-up programme of the Schokland 
Pact, the 2Scale programme gave IFDC the possibility to create PPPs in several African 
countries. DADTCO proved to be an interesting partner in one of these, namely 
Mozambique, as it was rapidly expanding its production here, due to a partnership with 
beer brewer SABMiller. Cassava could be used for the production of beer as a substitute 
for barley. Moreover, the cassava cakes produced by the AMPUs contained a 
significantly larger proportion of starch than do original ingredients such as sorghum or 
barley, therefore reducing the brewer’s production costs (International Fertilizer 
Development, 2013:25). SABMiller’s subsidiary Cervejas de Mocambique launched a 
cassava-based beer, called Impala, in Mozambique in 2011, which became successful 
as it was perceived to be a low cost, high quality beer that could compete with the low-
entry home-grown beers in rural areas. Therefore, DADTCO could provide the famers 
with a growing market for their produce. In order to expand the production, IFDC and 
DADTCO together combined efforts to develop the local value chains (Van Melick, 
2015: personal interview).    
Since its initiation in 2011 600 farmers became involved in the project in 
Mozambique, who together supplied approximately 2,800 metric tons of cassava roots 
to DADTCO in 2012, which in turn processed it into 1,600 metric ton cassava cakes. 
These numbers increased slightly during the following year, resulting in 2,989 metric 
ton of roots being process into approximately 1,650 metric ton of cassava cake. 
(International Fertilizer Development, 2013:28, 30). Because of this growth the project 
got expanded to Ghana in 2012, where IFDC and DADTCO cooperated with SABMiller 
as well. Cassava is Ghana’s main food crop and the country is the fourth largest producer 
of the root in Africa, making it an interesting location for the PPP. Although this project 
was marginal compared to the one in Mozambique, expectations were significant as, 
without previous experience in the country, SABMiller launched the cassava-based beer 
‘Eagle’ in 2013 (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:33).  
Because the project was still in its initiation phase DADTCO was only able to 
start operating its AMPU in January of that year. Consequently, no farmers were 
officially organized and registered to provide supply, nor did IFDC have time to train 
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them. Therefore, DADTCO purchased cassava roots on an ad hoc basis from “ready-to-
harvest fields” (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:32-36). Unfortunately, the 
partnership between DADTCO and IFDC had a very short lifespan, as DADTCO 
decided to terminate the project in the eastern region of the country in June 2013, due to 
problems concerning the quality of the water required for the production of the cassava 
cakes and due to the rising prices of the local cassava roots (International Fertilizer 
Development, 2013:36). Moreover, as in Nigeria, the IFDC management in West-Africa 
and DADTCO experienced communication problems. The activities in Mozambique 
were led by a different division from IFDC than in Ghana and Nigeria and both 
DADTCO and IFDC were able to develop a more sustainable relationship here (De 
Jager, 2015: personal interview). 
Based on the above it is safe to say that the project has been turbulent. The 
partnership appears to be more robust in Mozambique, as Nigeria and Ghana have been 
faced with both internal and external malfunctions. Learning from the problems 
DADTCO became a signatory partner to the contract between IFDC and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs during the 2Scale programme in Mozambique and Ghana. Moreover, in 
order to assure there was a market for the produce, DADTCO only initiated production 
in Ghana and Mozambique after it had signed a contract with SABMiller, therefore 
gaining trust from the farmers. This soothed communication between IFDC and 
DADTCO, as both could develop their part of the value chain, because the market was 
provided for. Both partners are now satisfied with the cooperation in Mozambique and 
the project appears to be successful (van Melick, 2015: personal interview). It should be 
noted however, that despite these efforts there still remains some threats to the local and 
household food security. It has been acknowledged that many of the farmers still operate 
on a short-term approach. As cassava does not have a specific harvesting time, nor has 
DADTCO set a threshold, farmers tend to sell cassava when the household’s needs are 
highest, instead of when the roots are at their optimal growth. This might cause food 
insecurity in later stages (Sopov et al, 2014:74).  
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Partners’ goals and motives 
 With regards to goals and motives, this partnership resembles the PPP between 
Heineken and EUCORD. “The project’s primary mission was to strengthen smallholder 
farmers’ access to value-added markets for cassava products by facilitating the 
development of a sustainable cassava value chain” (International Fertilizer 
Development, 2013:2). Through training and by providing the farmers with a market for 
their surplus, the partners aim to transform cassava from a subsistence crop into a cash 
crop. Food security is expected to increase as farmers are enabled to raise their yield and 
sell the surplus on the local market. Thus increasing the supply of food. Besides, the 
farmers themselves will also have more disposable income, which allows them to 
increase their consumption and overall development (Calon, 2015: personal interview; 
Van Melick, 2015: personal interview).  
 DADTCO’s social entrepreneurship facilitated finding common ground between 
the partners. The company’s CEO used to be active in the field of development studies 
and incorporated this into DADTCO’s ideology. Consequently, social corporate 
responsibility is an intrinsic aspect of the company’s grounds (Calon, 2015: personal 
interview). Besides DADTCO, also the other two partners acknowledged the potential 
cassava has to offer. As pointed out before, it is one of the largest food crops in Africa, 
however, it is barely used for industrial purposes. Because of its value for African small-
holder farmers, it is an opportune crop to be used to improve local food security. Many 
projects have attempted to exploit this potential in local development projects, but were 
often halted by the roots high perishability. DADTCO’s AMPUs bypass this problem, 
as the processing unit can be transported to the farmer, instead of the farmer having to 
transport his produce to the processing unit. IFDC, who has been working to improve 
agricultural productivity in developing countries for many years, recognized the 
technology’s potency as an important development to improve small-holder farmers’ 
food security and became motivated to cooperate with DADTCO. With minimal input 
one could produce 8 to 10 ton of cassava roots per hectare. However, a small investment 
in varieties and crop rotation could already increase this number up to 20 to 25 tons per 
hectare, indicating the potential (De Jager, 2015: personal interview). The same could 
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be said for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was actively looking for 
innovative ways to improve food security and work towards achieving Millennium 
Development Goal 1  (Calon, 2015: personal interview).  
 Unfortunately, during later stages of the project some differences in goals and 
motives rose to the surface as well. Despite their social incentives DADTCO as a private 
actor is obligated to make profit. As a relatively young enterprise it did not have much 
saved for a rainy day. This became visible when the project in Nigeria stagnated (De 
Jager, 2015: personal interview). DADTCO now had to prioritize its business merits and 
adapt its policies accordingly, while the public actors pushed for continuation of the 
ideological importance. This has led to conflicts of interest between the partners (De 
Jager, 2015: personal interview; Van Melick, 2015: personal interview).  
 
Organisational set up 
 As mentioned before, the partnership between the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, IFDC and DADTCO originally merely was an official partnership between the 
former two partners. DADTCO was no formal signatory to the contract. Instead, the 
cooperation between IFDC and DADCTO got written down in a memorandum of 
understanding. Consequently, DADTCO was officially not in a partnership with the 
Dutch government. IFDC received funding from the Ministry, €6 million in total, in 
order to develop the upstream activities of the cassava value chain, which resolved 
around the cultivation of the cassava roots. Depending on the project, IFDC cooperated 
with some other actors as well for their expertise. For example, in Mozambique, IFDC 
contracted the IIAM (Mozambique Institute for Agricultural Research) to develop 
improved cassava seeds (De Jager, 2015: personal interview).  
DADTCO invested itself in those particular activities of the project it participated 
in. These involved the downstream processes, including the transportation of the 
AMPUs to the farmers, the processing of the cassava into cakes and flour, and securing 
the market for the produce. IFDC’s activities involved “working with farmer 
organizations to identify participating farmers and build their organizational capacity, 
increasing productivity of farmers’ yields through the dissemination of Good 
59 
 
Agricultural Practices (GAP), and strengthening of agro-input services such as stems, 
fertilizers, and farm equipment” (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:2). The 
Ministry does not take an active role in this partnership, but primarily functions as the 
financier and controller of the annual plan and budget (Calon, 2015: personal interview).    
This division of labour would allow the partners to operate in their own areas of 
expertise. Unfortunately, it did not remain sustainable as the planning of the process was 
not always executed well. As mentioned before, DADTCO decided where it would 
transport its AMPUs to and IFDC arranged for the farmers to be organized to have the 
produce delivered on time. This required close collaboration between the partners. When 
the communication did not take place as expected IFDC was the one to be held 
accountable for deviations from the annual plan and budget, since they were the 
contracting partner who received the funding. This organizational structure caused 
frictions between DADTCO and IFDC as the latter was accountable for actions it could 
not control (De Jager, 2015: personal interview).  
The Ministry has a rather passive role in this partnership, as it argued that there 
should be a divide between the actor controlling the annual plan and budget and the one 
who executes it. It did however attempt to bring the parties together again, and thus got 
shifted into the role of mediator (Calon, 2015: personal interview). Therefore, in 2011 
it conducted a mid-term review. One of the main conclusions was that the partnership 
lacked a “joint-management and decision making structure” (Helping Farmers, 2013: 
46). In order to solve this issue the review proposed to assign the management of the 
project to a joint DADTCO IFDC Management Team steered by representatives of both 
partners. At the local executive level the Management Team would exist of one 
representative of each partner, as well as a representative of the local government, who 
met on a weekly basis and prepared monthly working plans. Moreover, the review also 
proposed the creation of a steering committee led by the Dutch embassy, in which all 
the stakeholders would get a voice. Unfortunately, these recommendations were not put 
into practise as the partnership in Nigeria dissolved before its end date, neither have they 
been implemented in Ghana or Mozambique (International Fertilizer Development, 
2013: 46).  
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Legitimacy of the partnership 
This partnership scores average concerning its representativeness and inclusion. 
The PPP consist of one public, one private and one civic actor, and on an irregular 
basis involves the local government, industry and knowledge institutions. However, 
not all these actors are equally included in the decision-making process. Although the 
partnership includes the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it has a passive role, 
abstaining from participating in the day-to-day decision-making process. Moreover, 
DADTCO and IFDC write the annual plan and draft the budget, which means that the 
Ministry is also only limitedly involved in the long-term decision-making process. 
Also the other actors do not have a say regarding the daily decisions. Consequently, 
the partnership’s inclusion mainly exist of one private and one civic actor, both from 
the developing world. It could be argued, however, that the role of SABMiller in the 
projects in Mozambique and Ghana has been more prominent, as the company 
provides the market for the cassava. Since the demand is the primary driving factor in 
the decision-making process, SABMiller could actually play a significant role, 
however indirectly and not formally represented in the partnership.   
Transparency and deliberation between the partners was also limited, as a result 
of communication issues. It should be noted, however, that there is a significant 
difference between the projects in Nigeria and Ghana on the one hand and 
Mozambique on the other, as the project in Mozambique is growing and the 
collaboration between the partners appears robust (Van Melick, 2015: personal 
interview). In Nigeria and Ghana, however, the communication between the partners 
was insufficient. As mentioned before, DADTCO decided where it would station its 
AMPUs and based on that information IFDC trained the farmers living in that area. 
However, there was no deliberation between DADTCO and IFDC with regard to the 
stationing of these processing units. Both partners worked their part of the project, 
either downstream or upstream, but the communication to combine the two sections 
effectively was lacking. The transparency about one another’s short-term plans was 
not communicated adequately. IFDC perceived the DADTCO management to operate 
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on an ad hoc basis, while DADTCO reproached IFDC to be inflexible and not 
sufficiently market-oriented (De Jager, 2015: personal interview).  
These deficiencies also hindered the partnership’s goal rationality and rendered 
it less effective.  The project’s goals are clearly outlined, as mentioned above, however 
the means to achieve these goals have not been implemented effectively in Nigeria and 
Ghana. As a result of deficiencies in the planning and communication between the 
partners, it has occurred several times that the AMPUs were not placed where they 
were expected to be, leaving the farmers without a market for their produce. As a 
result of these malfunctions the means could not be used to their full potential. 
Consequently, the partnership has not been as effective as was hoped. Before the start 
of the partnership the project was expected to involve approximately 12,000 small-
holder farmer families, together producing 720,000 metric tons of cassava by the third 
project year in Nigeria, after which it would be expanded to Togo and Benin 
(International Fertilizer Development, 2013:38-39). Unfortunately, this expansion did 
not take place as only 1.195 farmers were incorporated by the third year supplying 
4.457 metric tons of cassava roots to the AMPUs (International Fertilizer 
Development, 2013:6). It should be noted, however, that the initial plan was too 
ambitious as it takes time to transform a subsistence crop into an industrial value chain 
(Calon, 2015:personal interview). Again, the difference between Nigeria and Ghana on 
the one hand, and the collaboration in Mozambique on the other hand should also be 
mentioned, as the project in Mozambique currently includes 4.600 farmers and 
continues to grow (Sopov et al, 2014:71).  
Food security, unfortunately, did not improve as much as expected, as 
DADTCO had difficulties securing a market for the produce, because of the strong 
lobbying activities in favour of the imported wheat flour and the closing of the largest 
purchaser of the cakes. Moreover, because farmers are not sufficiently business-
oriented and DADTCO does not set a threshold for the harvesting of cassava, the 
farmers tend to sell their cassava when the household needs are highest, instead of 
when yield would be optimal. Therefore, the farmer might gain less from its produce 
than possible. This could result in food insecurity in later stages. It should be noted, 
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however, that the farmers did benefit from the agricultural training and the improved 
varieties received from IFDC, because they were able to improve their yields 
significantly and therefore had more food to consume (De Jager, 2015: personal 
interview). Also the local market for cassava expanded, as a result of these 
developments, therefore mitigating the effects of low demands for cassava cake.  
3.1.3. Smarter Futures – Improving quality wheat and maize flour in Africa 
 
Background 
The Smarter Futures partnership got established in 2008 between four partners 
from various backgrounds with the financial support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
The Food Fortification Initiative (formerly the Flour Fortification Initiative) is the 
initiator of the partnership and is seen as the umbrella partner to which all the other 
partners, except Hellen Keller International, are a member (Verster, 2015: personal 
interview). This organisation aims at promoting fortification of grains by cooperating in 
multi-stakeholder partnerships. The private actor partner, AkzoNobel is an international 
paintings and coating company and world leader in the production of iron EDTA, the 
iron compound which is used to fortify whole wheat flours. The third partner, the 
International Federation of Spina Bifida and Hydrocephalus (IF), is a civil society 
organisation which combines the efforts of 44 national and regional spina bifida and 
hydrocephalus organisations in 41 countries. It aspires to reduce the incidence of spina 
bifida and hydrocephalus and to improve the quality of life for people living with these 
disabilities. The third civil society partner, Helen Keller International (HKI), is a 
worldwide NGO dedicated to combating the consequences and causes of blindness, loss 
of sight and malnutrition. It does so through local and regional programmes in Asia and 
Africa where it provides education on nutrition and assists countries in putting in place 
food fortification programmes (Smarter Futures, 2011:6-7).  
All the partners are involved in food fortification, albeit in their particular area of 
expertise. IF is primarily concerned with fortification of wheat products by adding folic 
acid. Adding this vitamin to food will lead to a decrease of birth defects, such as spina 
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bifida. Hellen Keller International, on the other hand, started off by mainly fortifying 
with vitamin A, as it decreases the incidences of blindness, but has since moved to the 
full scala of fortification of flour and cooking oils. The partnership with AkzoNobel is 
especially useful for Smarter Futures, as AkzoNobel was the first to produce food-grade 
iron EDTA to be used in food products. FFI, as the umbrella organisation, does not 
specify in one particular vitamin, but instead promotes fortification in general. Through 
FFI’s network the partners became acquainted with one another’s work and decided to 
collaborate, as they recognized that there was a lack of advocacy about food fortification 
and quality control on fortification programmes, especially in Africa. HKI only joint the 
partnership several months after its initiation  (Bauwens, 2015: personal interview; 
Verster, 2015: personal interview). 
Approximately one third of people in Sub-Saharan Africa do not have sufficient 
vitamin and mineral intake, “impacting physical and cognitive development and 
disability among populations, as well as the economic prospects of nations” (Smarter 
Futures, 2011:16). Food fortification plays a key role in preventing the negative 
consequences of food insecurity and its effects on a country’s economy. According to 
the ‘Global Progress Report on Vitamin and Mineral Deficiencies’ drafted by UNICEF 
and the Micronutrient Initiative, vitamin and mineral deficiencies result in a loss of GDP 
between 1% and 2.5% on average (Adamson, 2004:37). Fortifying staple foods such as 
rice, maize, wheat and cassava with micronutrients such as folic acid, zinc, iron and 
other B-vitamins is a relatively simple method of combating malnutrition, without 
requiring people to change their diet.  
Moreover, it is very cost-effective. On average, in Africa, the benefit for cost 
ratio of fortifying food is 8/10:1, indicating that for every dollar invested in food 
fortification the economic gain will be eight- to tenfold (Smarter Futures, 2011:11). In 
recent years food fortification has increasingly gained attention. International 
organisations such as WFP and FAO are no longer primarily focussing on the quantity 
of food. Instead, the quality of food gained importance as well, leaving room for a 
growing attention on food fortification. Unfortunately, at the beginning of the century, 
only few countries in Africa already fortified food. Smarter Futures got created in order 
to help countries embark on effective fortification (Verster, 2015: personal interview). 
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In 2009 the first project term was initiated with a relatively small budget, 
compared to the other case studies, of €838.500,- of which 38% (€319.00,-) was derived 
from the Schokland Fund (Van Gerwen and Van Ede, 2014:168). Despite this small 
budget, Smarter Futures does not specify to a particular target area. Instead, it aims at 
making food fortification legally binding in every African country. It does so through 
training and advocacy. During the first project period (2009-2011) twelve countries 
achieved the goal of nationwide flour fortification. As a consequence, the project got 
extended until December 2017 and got renamed ´Upscaling Smarter Futures’ (Smarter 
Futures, 2014:2). For this second term the budget got extended significantly to 
€3.750.000,- of which 40%  (€1.500.000,-) is provided by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Smarter Futures, 2014:2). The remaining 60% is provided for in cash or in-kind 
by the other partners.  
 
Partners’ goals and motives 
Smarter Futures aims to make fortification of wheat and flour legally binding in 
each African country. It is a public-private-civic network that attempts to bring the 
stakeholders together on a national and regional level and provide them with technical 
assistance and training, for example to millers, but also it aims to influence government 
regulation and standards´ harmonisation to enable fortification, (Verster, 2015: personal 
interview). It primarily targets children, adolescents and women of child-bearing age, as 
these groups are most vulnerable to the consequences of vitamin and mineral 
deficiencies (Smarter Futures, 2011: 17). In order to achieve the overall goal of food 
fortification in Africa, the partnership established several short-term goals during the 
upscaling of the project in 2011. The following, more specific, goals are expected to be 
met by the end of the second project term (2012-2017): 
 “By end of 2017, most countries in Africa will have a National Fortification 
Alliance, a functioning public-private partnership that will make sure that all 
wheat flour and products (bread, chapatti) in their country are fortified with 
essential vitamins and minerals.  
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 By end of 2017, in 7 new countries over 75% of all industrial wheat flour 
produced will be adequately fortified, i.e. Gambia, Mauritania, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, Rwanda. 
 By end of 2017, 15 additional countries are expected to have started fortifying 
their wheat flour with iron and folic acid, and possibly zinc and vitamin B-12, 
based on scientifically sound and technically feasible standards and with 
mandatory regulations for both in-country production and imports. These are: 
Botswana, Namibia, Congo, Madagascar, Niger, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Mauritius, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Burundi” (Smarter Futures, 
2014:2). 
Smarter Futures, together with FFI, has developed several advocacy and technical 
tools to be used by their African partners in order to work towards achieving these goals. 
They have developed an Advocacy Toolkit for Fortifying with Folic Acid, providing 
stakeholders with all the necessary information about fortification with folic acid, its 
benefits, and the consequences of folic acid deficiencies. Also, a Millers Toolkit has 
been developed, because millers are the executors of the fortification process. This 
toolkit  includes information on how to successfully fortify wheat and maize, as well as 
technical and commercial advise. In addition to this toolkit, Smarter Futures and FFI 
have created a Monitor for Quality and Impact, in order to assess the quality of the 
fortified flour and its impact on the target group. This toolkit is especially developed for 
millers and government authorities, such as food safety agencies, to allow them to track 
the programme’s impact (Smarter Futures, 2011:11).  
A Cost-Benefit Analysis Tool has also been developed in order to monitor the 
economic costs of not fortifying and compare it with the benefits of the fortification 
project on a country-level. It is a useful measure in order to gain stakeholder’s 
confidence on the (economic) importance of fortification (Food Fortification Initiative, 
2015). Finally, a method of auditing the impact of the flour fortification programmes 
has been developed as an extension of the Monitor for Quality and Impact, named 
FORTIMAS (Fortification Monitoring and Surveillance). This programme answers the 
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question: “is the micronutrient status of those who regularly consume sufficient quality 
fortified flour improving?” (Smarter Futures, 2015). FORTIMAS enables countries that 
implemented a food fortification programme to view trends and therefore assess the 
impact of the programme, without having to conduct expensive and time-consuming 
surveys. These can still be conducted in later stages, after the project has been 
implemented for several years. In the meantime, FORTIMAS allows for short-term 
impact assessment. Through training and advocacy people are educated on the usages 
of each of these tools (Verster, 2015: personal interview). 
As mentioned before, the partners decided to combine efforts in this partnership 
because they all aim to increase the intake of fortified food in Africa, and acknowledged 
the need for more advocacy and training concerning this topic. FFI initiated this 
partnership as the African branch to its existing network, because Africa was the 
continent with the lowest amount of fortified food being consumed. This new 
partnership would therefore focus its attention solely on Africa. The International 
Federation for Spina Bifida and Hydrocephalus became involved in the partnership, 
because of the potential it offered to expand its reach. The organisation already had been 
active in fortifying flour with folic acid for several years, however, fortification usually 
involves adding several vitamins and minerals jointly. Therefore, collaborating with 
other organisations also involved in food fortification, using different vitamins and 
minerals, expands the possibilities for IF. Moreover, because birth deficiencies such as 
spina bifida cannot be cured, but only prevented, it is important to increase the coverage, 
as food fortification is the most effective method to increase people´s vitamin and 
mineral intake. HKI joint the partnership with similar motives, as the organisation aims 
at preventing blindness through fortification with vitamin A (Bauwens, 2015: personal 
interview).  
Vice versa, AkzoNobel became involved, because the company could enlarge its 
market through Smarter Futures, as the national Food Fortification Alliances and other 
stakeholders might want to fortify using their iron EDTA. However, it should be noted 
that AkzoNobel also acts out of corporate social responsibility, as the food industry is 
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not within its core business in any manner (Bauwens, 2015: personal interview). Finally, 
the Ministry got involved in the partnership, because the project is one of the few aiming 
at prevention. Under the Schokland Pact, there are several other projects concerned with 
food security, however, all aim at fighting the problem, instead of preventing it. 
Therefore, this project offered an interesting variation to the other projects funded by 
the Dutch government (Leeflang, 2015: personal interview).  
 
Organisational set up 
Smarter Futures can be regarded as the ‘African branch’ of the Food Fortification 
Initiative. It uses the FFI network and promotes and strengthens the activities of FFI’s 
partners, among others, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Global Alliance for 
Improved Nutrition (GAIN), UNICEF, and the World Bank. This partnership functions 
differently from the other two case studies. Instead of actively being involved in the 
production processes, Smarter Futures is a network of partners, each with their own 
activities, aiming at advocacy and training in distinct regions in Africa. (Smarter 
Futures, 2014:2). Therefore, the partnership does not create organisations itself, nor does 
it “invest large programme resources at country level” (Flour Fortification, 2011:10). 
Instead, it supports the creation of local and national public-private partnerships at the 
promotion of fortification. In many countries these partnerships are called ´National 
Fortification Alliances´ existing of flour millers, governments, international 
organisations and mineral suppliers (Bauwens, 2015: personal interview). 
Each partner committed to the partnership by means of signing a letter of intent, 
in which it outlined the contributions it would provide to the partnership, as well as its 
roles and responsibilities (Verster, 2015: personal interview). Because of this 
organisational arrangement, only IF has a formal contract with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, as they are the ones to receive the funding from the Dutch government. These 
financial means are used to execute the project on a regional and country-level, i.e. 
providing training and workshops. Besides managing the public fund, IF also 
contributes with its own means to the partnership. It takes responsibility for the website, 
for example, and the publication of the monitoring tools. 
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HKI is primarily focussed on West-Africa, which resulted in them coordinating 
Smarter Futures’ activities in that region. They mainly contribute in-kind, for example 
through providing workshops (Bauwens, 2015: personal interview;  Verster, 2015: 
personal interview). AkzoNobel, is the largest cash donor together with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Besides this contribution, they also provide technical expertise on the 
usage of iron EDTA in fortification processes. The Ministry has a rather passive role in 
the partnership. They function primarily as the financier and controller of the annual 
plan and budget. The argument under the original Schokland Agreement was that the 
actor financing and controlling the project should not be involved in its execution 
(Leeflang, 2015: personal interview).  
As mentioned earlier, Smarter Futures is a network in which the partners combine 
efforts, but remain active in their own areas. Therefore, the partners do not always 
perform in name of Smarter Futures. Instead, each partner has its own activities, which 
are mostly executed using their own name. However, when one of these activities is 
related to fortification the partners will operate in name of Smarter Futures (Bauwens, 
2015: personal interview). For example,  IF is also active in other domains, such as 
human rights and international solidarity. Activities in Africa concerning these domains 
will be executed in name of IF, however, when the events are related to food fortification 
Smarter Futures’ brand will be used (Bauwens, 2015: personal interview). This year, a 
training on neural tube defects will be given in Zambia, where the partners will work 
together in name of Smarter Futures. Stakeholders from other countries in the region 
will be invited to partake in order to increase the coverage. Besides educating the 
participants on the issue at stake Smarter Futures also attempts to bring together 
stakeholders in order to establish new partnerships, such as the National Fortification 
Alliances, or deepen and expand already existing ones (Verster, 2015: personal 
interview).   
In order to coordinate these activities a steering committee was set up, existing 
of a representative of each of the partners, except for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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This committee decides on the annual plan and budget, including the activities that will 
take place in the up-coming year and the priority countries where they will take place 
(Leeflang, 2015: personal interview). These countries are selected on the basis of an 
empirical assessment conducted by FFI in order to map those countries that need extra 
attention concerning food fortification, for example Ethiopia (Verster, 2015: personal 
interview). The steering committee meets twice a year, often once physical and once 
using Skype. It is difficult to assemble all the partners, because they are located in 
different parts of the world. During these meetings the annual report and the annual plan 
are drafted (Bauwens, 2015: personal interview; Verster 2015: personal interview). 
Besides, the partners also divide the tasks and responsibilities. Who is initiating and 
coordinating which workshop, for example. In executing these activities cooperation is 
sought with local governments, millers and local NGOs, all from the developing 
countries. Smarter Futures also cooperates with other industrial actors from the 
developed world, such as DSM, Mühlenchemie and BASF as they supply the partners 
with premixes used for fortification.  
 
Legitimacy of the partnership 
 Assessing this partnership’s representativeness asks for a different approach 
compared to the other two case studies. This partnership largely exists of NGO’s, one 
private actor AkzoNobel, and one public actor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All are 
based in developed countries, although HKI participates in Smarter Futures through its 
regional offices in Dakar and Senegal, and FFI has an Africa Network Coordinator 
working from Uganda. Therefore, it could be argued that the partnership itself scores 
average on representativeness. However, because of its nature as a network, Smarter 
Futures does also represent actors in the developing world, such as millers, national 
governments, and local NGOs, mainly through the creation of, and support for, the 
National Fortification Alliances. Also through the use of the FFI network, other 
organisations and companies from developed countries are involved, such as UNICEF, 
GAIN and DSM. It should be noted, however, that these partners officially do not form 
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part of the original partnership. Neither do they take part in the decision-making process. 
Decisions regarding the partnerships policy are made by the steering committee.  
This committee includes all the partners, except for the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Although the project proposal states that “the Dutch government is welcome to 
join this group”, it does not take part in the decision-making process, because it prefers 
to refrain itself from influencing financial decisions, due to its function as the financier 
(Smarter Futures, 2011:7). However, as the controller of the annual plan and budget the 
Ministry could have a steering role, because it has the power to deny particular plans or 
advise on adjustments (Leeflang, 2015: personal interview). Each of the partners is 
therefore held responsible by the Ministry. However, as the contractor with the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, IF plays an important role here as well. Because IF manages the 
budget and financial reports all the other partners have to justify their expenses to IF, 
who in turn sends the financial report to the Ministry for control. Because of this set up, 
the partnership scores low on inclusiveness as only one private actor and three NGOs 
from the developed region are involved. Although the PPP affects African policies, the 
stakeholders are not included in the decision-making process.   
 Contrary to the two indicators above, the partnership does score well on 
transparency. All the partners have access to the annual reports, forward plans and 
budget. These are also made public on the website, for other partners and stakeholders 
to read.  Moreover, partners keep one another updated on their individual plans and 
activities and seek cooperation when required. As with inclusiveness, the Ministry does 
not form part of this exchange of information. It is not deliberately excluded, however, 
but preferred to take up a passive role in the partnership. It has access however to the 
annual reports, forward plans and budget (Leeflang, 2015: personal interview). 
 The Ministry does not take part in the bi-annual meetings either. Since this PPP 
is relatively small and not active on a daily basis, because each of the partners have their 
own activities as well, deliberation between the partners occurs regularly, but not often. 
This also depends on the agenda, i.e. whether there is an event planned for example. 
However, the partners do discuss all relevant issues and each has an equal share in the 
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discussion. It should be noted nonetheless, that deliberation with AkzoNobel has been 
more turbulent, because food fortification does not form part of the company’s core 
business. AkzoNobel’s commitment has therefore been highly dependent on the efforts 
of a small group of people. Due to restructuring of the internal organisation, 
communication and deliberation with the private actor have been hindered somewhat 
(Bauwens, 2015: personal interview).  
 The partnership scores well on goal rationality, but assessing its effectiveness is 
a critical point. Although the PPP has clearly indicated its goals, both short- and long-
term, and it is actively working towards achieving these goals, the PPP cannot take 
responsibility for implementing flour fortification in African countries. Smarter Futures 
itself does not implement food fortification programmes, but supports those who do. 
Therefore, assessing the partnership’s effectiveness is difficult. Since the start of the 
partnership in 2009 there has been a significant increase in countries that are fortifying 
flour, as can be seen in the maps below.  
 
Figure 3.1: Status of fortification in Africa in respectively 2008, 2011 and 2014 
(Adapted from Smarter Futures, 2014:5) 
 
              2008           2011       2014    
                           
Red – not yet actively pursuing fortification  Yellow – help is needed to achieve fortification 
Blue – fortifying 75% of wheat flour  Green – On track to fortify 75% of wheat flour 
within a year 
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Despite these improvements it is difficult to assess the actual impact of the 
partnership, since it is impossible to measure the influence and result of the training 
and technical assistance that it provides. It is only possible to measure its input, output 
and outcome (Verster, 2015: personal interview). Input involves the events organised 
by the partnership, the training and workshops given. Output concerns the amount of 
people being trained to effectively implement a fortification programme or quality 
control, for example. Since the start of the project in 2009 Smarter Futures has 
provided training on fortification and quality control to stakeholders from 28 countries 
(Smarter Futures, 2014:4). The outcome is related to the amount of millers that are 
now fortifying their produce correctly, the number of NFA’s that have been created 
and made aware on the issue at hand and the tools that have been developed. However, 
Smarter Futures cannot claim sole responsibility for the impact of the project and the 
work of the Fortification Alliances. It can only say it has contributed to the increase in 
fortification. At present, 28 African countries actively fortify flour (Verster, 2015: 
personal interview).  
Because Smarter Futures cannot claim direct impact, it is difficult to assess its 
effectiveness on improving food security. The partnership can only claim indirect 
impact. According to Scott Montgomery, FFI Director, “the health benefits of food 
made with fortified flour are probably reaching somewhere between an additional 15 
million and 82 million people in 2013 compared to 2011” (Food Fortification 
Initiative, 2015). These are very broad estimates, varying even more between the 
African regions, as well as between the rural and urban areas. Bread and other flour 
products are primarily consumed in urban areas, resulting in higher access to fortified 
flour than in rural regions (Food Fortification Initiative, 2015). In West-Africa, where 
most progress has been made, 90% of the overall population consumes fortified flour 
(Food Fortification Initiative, 2015). And on average, the prevalence of neural tube 
defects (NTDs), such as spina bifida, decreases with 46% when the population has 
access to fortified flour (Smarter Futures, 2014b; 5). Unfortunately, it remains difficult 
to determine the percentage of wheat flour consumption as part of the total food 
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consumption, making it problematic to report on the actual average intake per person 
of fortified flour in Africa.   
3.2 Concluding remarks 
Based on the three PPPs described in the case studies it is possible to draw 
conclusions on their legitimacy as actors to improve food security in Africa. All three 
cases score well on representation (score = 4). Because of the nature of the projects, 
partners from both the public and private sector as well as civil society have been 
represented in each of the partnerships. However, representation of the target group 
and local governments in the developing countries varies between the partners and 
remains rather difficult. In order to create broad public support for the project it is 
necessary, however to incorporate these stakeholders. The same accounts for inclusion 
(score = 3/4). Again, a public, private and civil society actor take part in the decision-
making process, but these are primarily from the developed world. The stakeholders 
from the developing world are often not included. In two of the three partnerships the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained a passive role and was reluctant to get actively 
involved in the decision-making process, as it preferred to separate the roles of 
financier/controller and executor. However, as became clear in the partnership 
between EUCORD and Heineken, both partners appreciated an active involvement 
from the Ministry and the project even benefitted from this position, because the 
Ministry brought in particular knowledge concerning development, as well as its local 
network of government representatives.  
All three partnerships also score very well on transparency (score = 5) and, 
despite some variation between the partnerships, deliberation also occurs frequently 
between the partners and concerning all relevant issues (score = 3/4). Because the 
partnerships exists of only a few partners, it is relatively easy to deliberate with one 
another. But also due to the necessity to cooperate in order for the partnership to be 
successful the partners are transparent about their activities and communicate on a 
regular basis. As the Cassava+ project indicated, it is necessary for the partners to 
deliberate frequently and take important decisions jointly. In this partnership 
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DADTCO is in the lead as it decides where and when it will place its AMPUs. IFDC 
has to adapt to these decisions. This can cause frictions when the communication is 
insufficient and the partners are not transparent about their activities, especially when 
the roles and responsibilities are not adequately formulated. Therefore, in order for the 
partners to deliberate effectively and the partnership to be successful, it is important to 
have the roles and responsibilities clearly indicated.  
Goal rationality is also an important aspect of a successful partnership. All three 
cases have clearly outlined their goals and are actively working towards achieving 
these (score = 4/5). Again, it is significant for the partners to find common ground in 
their goals and motives before the start of the project, so they will all work in unison in 
order to achieve this objective. In order for the partners to find this common ground it 
is helpful to work in the private actor’s core-business. This will make the company 
enthusiastic and willing to invest, as is the case with DADTCO and Heineken. 
AkzoNobel, on the other hand, is less involved in the partnership, because the project 
is concerned with a smaller and more insignificant aspect of the company. Moreover, 
it is also necessary for the private company to be able to take a long-term perspective, 
since these projects are long-term commitments. An issue in the Cassava+ project was 
the fact that DADTCO was not able to uphold its commitment during economically 
difficult times. This affected the relationship with IFDC, but also hampered the 
projects effectiveness. Heineken, in contrast, a large and vested company, is better able 
to make long-term commitments, also because the Heineken family still owns a little 
over the majority shares of the company. The short-term goals of being profitable and 
satisfying the shareholders is important, but the company is able to take a long-term 
perspective, which is required for development projects like these.  
Finally, the partnerships have been effective in varying ways (score = 3/4), 
depending on the region of engagement, the organisational set up and external factors. 
For a PPP to be effective the five indicators discussed above need to be covered. As 
indicated by the Cassava+ partnership, when the roles and responsibilities are not 
clearly formulated form the onset and there is a lack of transparency, deliberation and 
inclusion, the partnership will not be effective. However, as indicated by the same 
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Cassava+ project in Mozambique, when the partners actively work to improve these 
aspects it is possible to positively alter its course and effectively work towards 
achieving these goals. Although all three cases have been effective overall, it remains 
difficult to examine the effectiveness of the partnerships in improving food security. 
This is especially the case regarding the Smarter Futures partnership. Because of its 
nature as a network it cannot claim direct impact. The partnership provides an 
infrastructure for stakeholders to be able to effectively implement flour fortification 
programmes in order to improve the regional or national micronutrient situation. 
However, the number of countries fortifying flour has increased significantly since the 
start of the project from merely 9 in 2008 to 28 at this moment (Smarter Futures, 
2015). Both the Cassava+ project in Mozambique and the partnership between 
Heineken and EUCORD have been able to establish sustainable value chains, which 
increases the famer’s food production and income, leaving them more food secure. 
Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that, first, it is difficult to actually measure an 
improvement in food security and second, not always are crops being cultivated that 
are used as food crops, rendering the improvements lower than expected.  
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4 Conclusion 
This thesis examined the traditional ODA system providing food assistance and 
compared it with Public-Private Partnerships aiming to improve food security in 
fragile states in Africa, on the basis of their legitimacy. In operationalizing the concept 
of legitimacy by examining the representativeness, inclusion, transparency, 
deliberation, goal rationality and effectiveness, it was possible to adequately assess 
both systems.  
For both the traditional ODA system and Public-Private Partnerships 
representation of all the stakeholders involved does not appear to be an issue. 
However, PPPs are able to represent more stakeholders as they include the private 
sector. Unfortunately, both systems lack full inclusion of stakeholders from the 
developing world in the decision-making processes. Often NGOs and local 
governments from the developing world have less input in the decision-making 
process than actors from the developing world. In the traditional ODA system this is 
due to a skewed power relation. In the PPPs this is primarily because the decisions are 
being made at the managerial level between the initiators of the project originating 
from developed countries. However, actors from the developing world are regularly 
included in the daily decision-making process on the executive level, depending on the 
partnership. Therefore, it can be concluded that Public-Private Partnerships are able to 
aid in filling the participation deficit, including almost all the stakeholders in the 
partnership and its decision-making process. However, the level of participation varies 
between the partnerships.  
In contrast to the equality of PPPs and ODA with regards to representativeness 
and inclusions, there is a significant difference with regard to the transparency of both 
systems. As pointed out, transparency appears to be a critical point for the traditional 
ODA system, because of the high level of fragmentation in the system and the lack of 
openness about internal discussions. Due to an increasing public demand for more 
transparency, however, many organisations are now attempting to improve in this 
point. Nonetheless, there still remains significant room for improvement. Public-
Private Partnerships on the other hand, are examined to be transparent in 
77 
 
communicating their internal affairs, both within the organisation as well as towards 
third parties and other stakeholders. This is partly a result of the limited number of 
partners, which facilitates deliberation between the stakeholders. Consequently, 
Public-Private Partnerships also score rather well on deliberation. In general, 
communication between the partners occurs frequently, as most partners acknowledge 
its necessity in order for the partnership to be successful. Deliberation in the ODA 
system is difficult to examine as there is little known about the communication 
between the members of the multilateral organisations, such as WFP and FAO. 
However, as written in the statutes, the boards and other executive organs of these 
organisations are required to meet on a regular basis. Moreover, there is an increasing 
focus on deliberation between these institutions in order to coordinate their efforts.  
Goal rationality is a clear point of appraisal for both systems, as the goals are 
clearly indicated and the actors in the systems are actively using the available means to 
achieve these objectives. Unfortunately, these means are not always used effectively. 
Effectiveness remains a highly criticised issue for the traditional ODA system, 
especially in (Sub-Saharan) Africa. Despite numerous efforts to improve the 
effectiveness of the food assistance to the continent, its food security status remains 
behind on other developing regions. But also within Africa there are significant 
differences in the development of food security. Although the situation has improved 
since 1990, progress has been slow and skewed. Public-Private Partnerships, on the 
other hand, have been effective, albeit small-scale, in improving food security in 
Africa. All three projects have resulted in larger quantities and better quality of food 
available. Moreover, the PPPs have also increased, either direct or indirect, farmer 
families disposable income, allowing them to purchase more food and/or other 
necessities. It should be noted, nonetheless, that these improvements are still moderate, 
because the projects are all relatively young – 6 or 7 years at most – especially 
compared to the life cycle of ODA. Consequently, Public-Private Partnerships could 
aid to fill the implementation gap, albeit on a small-scale.  
However, in order for PPPs to be effective, there are several conditions which 
ought to be met. First, the roles and responsibilities between the partners need to be 
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clearly formulated and there needs to be common ground on the goals to be achieved. 
This will also be facilitated when the project takes places within the private actor’s 
core business, increasing its active cooperation and willingness to invest. Deliberation 
and the ultimate effectiveness of the partnership will be thwarted if these are not 
adequately defined at the start of the project. Second, the partners need to be in close 
contact with one another. Decisions need to be made through deliberation. Moreover, 
it is important to incorporate the local stakeholders in this process, in order to gain 
public support for the project, but also to increase its effectiveness, because these 
stakeholders provide in depth knowledge about the local situation. Finally, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs should take up an active role in the partnership, instead of 
merely remaining the financier, because it adds to the equation its experience in 
development as well as its network. Moreover, as a rather neutral partner it could 
balance the relation between the private actor and the civil society organisation.  
In conclusion, are Public-Private Partnerships legitimate tools of global 
governance to improve food assistance in fragile states compared to Official 
Development Assistance? PPPs, as multi-sectorial, transnational partnerships are well-
equipped to improve food security as an addition to Official Development Assistance, 
provided that the above mentioned conditions are met. If this is the case, PPPs enable 
rural communities to improve their long-term availability, accessibility and stability of 
food. However, there are several points of critique related to the selectivity and 
capacity of Public-Private Partnerships that hinder their potential as actors to improve 
food security in fragile states.  
First, although the theory argues that PPPs step in where governments fail, the 
case studies have pointed out that the partnerships deliberately choose not to become 
active in fragile situations, because these pose too high investment risks. All 
interviewees argued that a certain level of stability is required in order to develop the 
projects. Despite not actively becoming engaged in fragile states, the partnership 
between Heineken and EUCORD, however, does not withdraw the project when a 
situation turns fragile. This is partly because of social development reasons, but also 
because Heineken has a very stable bargaining position in most countries, as it often is 
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the largest tax payer. Overall, however, Public-Private Partnerships cannot fill the 
governance deficit and substitute the government when its capacity and competence 
are lacking. 
Second, PPPs mostly function on a small-scale. Because the partnerships exist 
only of few partners, whose capacity will be limited compared to international 
organisations such as WFP and FAO, they are only able to reach a relatively small part 
of the African population. Although, multinational companies such as Heineken have a 
large coverage, the reach of the partnership remains limited as extensive resources and 
time are required in order to extend the projects. Smarter Futures is the only 
partnership of the three that employs a large scale approach, focussing on the entire 
African continent. The other two partnerships focus on specific, local areas within 
countries. Scaling-up these partnerships raises the question who is to initiate and 
manage the projects in other areas? Should the private sector duplicate the partnership 
in all other regions where it is active or should the national governments take the upper 
hand, for example? Moreover, also within the countries particular areas of engagement 
are selected, bearing in mind the potential for successful implementation of the project. 
Certain levels of infrastructure, political and economic stability are required. 
Consequently, the partnerships do not necessarily target the most food insecure 
populations. Further research should examine the spin-off effect of the projects to 
other areas and populations. ODA, in contrast, has a much larger coverage and lacks 
this selectivity, therefore reaching a broader population. It should be noted however, 
that, as a result of ODA’s large scale focus, the assistance is also less targeted, which 
could render it less effective.  
As a result of these critiques, PPPs can form an important addition to the ODA 
system. By their nature, Public Private Partnerships, combine the strengths of their 
independent partners, while keeping each other in check. In the words of Paul Stanger, 
local sourcing director for Heineken in Africa and the Middle East: “PPPs keep us 
honest” (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). PPPs are transparent and inclusive 
instruments of global governance, able to effectively improve food security on a small-
scale. However, ODA remains an important provider of food assistance in order to 
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improve large-scale food security for the most food insecure populations and those in 
fragile situations.  
These conclusions are primarily based on information obtained through 
interviews with the partners involved in the PPPs, which could steer the outcome more 
positively towards the PPPs. Moreover, because of practical reasons, only three case 
studies could be examined, rendering the conclusions less strong. These three cases 
have been selected on the basis of their diversity, in order to obtain a broad view of 
PPPs as instruments to improve food security. However, this broad approach, made it 
difficult to draw strong conclusions. Further research should therefore examine a 
larger number of cases, using an observer approach to collecting the data.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: List of possible interviewees  
    
Partnership Name Function Organisation 
Increase food 
security and 
improve 
livelihoods of 
sorghum and 
rice producers. 
Paul Stanger 
 
Local Sourcing 
Director Africa and 
the Middle East 
Heineken 
International B.V. 
Henk Knipscheer Senior advisor European 
Cooperative for 
Rural 
Development 
Jurriaan Middelhof Policy officer Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Smarter futures 
– improving 
quality wheat 
and maize flour 
in Africa 
Mario Leeflang Senior policy advisor Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Anna Verster Project manager  Smarter Futures 
Lieven Bauwens Secretary General International 
Federation for 
Spina Bifida and 
Hydrocephalus 
Helping Farmers 
produce cassava 
for profit 
Andre de Jager Director North and 
West Africa Division 
International 
Fertilizer 
Development 
Center 
Monique Calon 
 
Senior policy advisor Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Hubert van Melick Managing Director 
Mozambique 
Dutch 
Agricultural 
Development and 
Trading 
Company 
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Appendix B: Interview questions 
Background questions 
1. What were the motives for Partner X to set up this Public-Private Partnership?  
2. What were the criteria on which the partners were selected? 
3. What were the criteria on which the countries/areas of engagement were 
chosen?  
a. Did the lack of a strong state influence your decision to engage in that 
particular country?  
b. If so, in what way did it influence this decision? 
4. How have you experienced the performance of the PPP in the selected countries 
so far? 
5. How is the project perceived locally in the areas of engagement?  
a. What is the perception of the local community?  
b. What is the perception of the local government/authority? 
6. Where there any differences in implementation and outcome of the projects in 
the distinct countries of engagement?  
a. How could you explain these differences?  
 
Legitimacy assessment questions 
7. How does the PPP function internally?  
a. Please explain the organisational structure of the PPP.  
i. Is there formal or informal hierarchy among the partners?  
ii. Is there an executive board working on behalf of the partners?  
iii. Could you explain in what way the partners are being held 
accountable? Are they equally responsible for each other’s 
actions? 
b. Do all the partners have an equal say in the decision-making process?  
c. How often do the partners meet to discuss the development of the 
partnership?  
d. Do all partners have access to the same information regarding the state 
of affairs of the partnership?  
e. Did the performance of the PPP affect the policy formulation in later 
stages of the partnership?    
i. If so, in what way?  
 
8. Please describe the partnerships main goals.   
a. Please outline the short-term as well as the long-term goals.  
b. How is the partnership working to achieve these?  
i. Does the partnership have clear regulation and programmes in 
order to implement its policy and to achieve its goals? 
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ii. Do all the partners comply to this policy? 
iii. Could you please describe the activities that are set up in order to 
achieve these goals?   
c. Which of these policy areas need improvement?  
 
9. Could you please elaborate on the main results that have been achieved so far?  
a. Did the partnership develop as initially expected?   
b. Are there any unforeseen positive or negative side effects that resulted 
from this partnership? 
 
10.  What are the most important lessons you have learned from this Partnership?  
a. Concerning the project as well as the organisation and cooperation of the 
Partnership, is there anything you would do differently next time? 
 
